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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units have 
become more frequently involved in peace support operations (PSOs). Moreover, they 
have become more deeply engaged with peoples of different national and organizational 
cultures. These multicultural peacekeeping environments are rife with communication 
difficulties. Coordination and cooperation between numerous actors present in the field 
such as International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, media, local 
authorities, tribal leaders and other individuals, has proved to be very challenging. 
Moreover, considering the nature of contemporary international interventions, any 
CIMIC staff is required to adapt to a wide range of new, non-military skills which would 
constitute a necessary “toolbox.” Culturally sensitive communications such as negotiation 
and media interactions are vital to effective coordination and cooperation in modern 
peacekeeping. Thus, CIMIC officers must know how to deal with the media; how, despite 
enormous cultural diversity, to successfully conduct their jobs; how to work efficiently 
with interpreters; and finally, how to resolve local conflicts using negotiations.  
Besides defining these new phenomena influencing CIMIC activities in PSOs, 
this thesis provides suggestions or basic universal guidelines for soldiers, especially for 
those acting at the tactical level. At the same time, the thesis should draw the attention of 
those people responsible for creating and executing the entire pre-deployment training for 
CIMIC soldiers who are going to be working abroad. The suggestions presented in this 
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A. REDEFINING THE MILITARY’S PRIORITIES 
The end of the long lasting Cold War brought enormous changes to the 
international structure of major powers. Well-known behavioral patterns of adversaries 
became outdated. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring a time of 
enduring peace to the world. The wars in former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and the 1991 
Gulf War proved to be new kinds of wars in their nature; wars which required a totally 
different and complex approach that demanded redefining the future of armed forces.1  
Military structures which had been created for the purposes of the Cold War are 
no longer useful. The armed forces of the future will serve as “the guarantors of foreign 
policies – of states, alliances and the United Nations – which are mainly aimed at 
stabilization and at pacification.”2 Moreover, they are to promote, preserve, and to 
implement various peace agreements; they guard existing borders and protect against any 
kind of violence. Global geostrategic changes demanded also the dismissal of 
confrontation and bipolarity, and the advent of a more cooperative world. Contemporary 
armies across the world are being trained to be more flexible and effective in very 
complicated interventions and humanitarian missions where numerous actors must meet 
and coexist in an uncertain environment.3 
Since 1989, peace interventions have been mandated mainly to carry out the 
implementation of various peace agreements and have resulted in countless challenges 
faced by UN forces. As Cedric de Coning suggests, the new tasks for military forces are 
related to “assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace agreement.”4 
Most of the actions taken by the peacekeepers are aimed not only at sustaining the peace 
but also at preventing the re-emergence of conflict by addressing the root causes.  
                                                 
1 Michael Keren, Donald A. Sylvan (ed.), International Intervention, Sovereignty versus 
Responsibility, Frank Cass, London, 2002, 114-115. 
2 Ibid., 119. 
3 Ibid., 121. 
4 Cedric de Coning, Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations, available at: 
http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/civmil2005.pdf (last visited on 13 November 2006). 
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B. DEFINING NEW MILITARY FUNCTIONS 
... peacekeeping is clearly a progression of military professionalism along 
managerial lines. Being the pragmatic military professional he is, the 
peace soldier is shaped by the concrete needs and demands of an 
immediate peacekeeping situation within the limits suited to and tolerated 
by the international mandate under which he serves. The peace soldier is 
one who is able to subscribe to the percepts of absolute minimal force, a 
reliance on compromise and negotiation, and the recognition of the 
elusiveness of permanent political solutions.5 
The characteristics of contemporary military forces have been enormously 
reshaped. Both flexibility and multifuncionality are as crucial for the modern military as 
firepower and battlefield mobility.  Soldiers of the future will have to be able to coexist 
and cooperate effectively with a multiplicity of actors such as International Organizations 
(IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and even the media when engaged in 
armed conflicts and various Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The new dimensions of 
military interventions require not only a maximum of flexibility of the commanders and 
the troops, “but also a multifuncionality for which the soldier has to be trained and 
equipped.”6 The new armed forces will have to be equally prepared for future combat, 
protection and humanitarian missions which very often will be organized under the 
mandate of the United Nations and composed of a multinational force.  
The role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units in the contemporary peace 
support operations is significantly increased. Moreover, they have become more deeply 
engaged with people of different national and organizational cultures. This multicultural 
peacekeeping environment is rife with communication difficulties. Coordination and 
cooperation between numerous actors present in the field also proves to be very 
challenging. Thus, considering the nature of contemporary international interventions, 
CIMIC staff is required to adopt a wide range of new, non-military skills which would 
constitute a necessary “toolbox.” Cross-cultural communications appears to play a 
significant role for CIMIC. Thus, CIMIC officers must know how to deal with the media, 
                                                 
5 Charles Moskos, Jr. Peace Soldiers. The University of Chicago Press, 1976, 137. 
6 Keren and Sylvan, 122-123. 
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how, despite enormous cultural diversity, to successfully conduct their job, how to work 
efficiently with interpreters, and finally, how to resolve local conflicts using negotiations.  
Culturally sensitive communication, negotiation, and media interactions are vital 
to effective coordination and cooperation in modern peacekeeping. Considering the 
nature of tasks conducted by Civil-Military Cooperation personnel in the peacekeeping 
environment, both defining major communication obstacles and providing basic 
guidelines about successful cross-cultural relations can prove very helpful for CIMIC 
personnel. Thus, defining and describing the major communication challenges and 
presenting useful hints for CIMIC staff will significantly contribute to the enhancing of 
CIMIC’s performance in the field. Chapter Two of this thesis examines in detail the 
doctrinal interpretation of CIMIC and the essential purposes of its existence. Clear 
definition of basic tasks and procedures performed by CIMIC personnel in peacekeeping 
environment will significantly contribute to the better understanding of CIMIC. 
Challenges connected with cooperation and coordination between various organizations 
and the military in PSOs are also discussed in this chapter. Discussions about cooperation 
and coordination are presented from both the military and the civilian perspective. 
Following chapters focus on the ways CIMIC personnel currently communicate and 
should communicate with the civilian community comprising the peacekeeping 
environment. Chapter Three presents relationships between the media and military with a 
particular emphasis on CIMIC applications. Moreover, it provides a basic set of 
guidelines for CIMIC officers on how to deal with the media effectively and how 
military-media cooperation can become mutually beneficial. Chapter Four describes the 
role of culture in modern peacekeeping. Relations between international military 
contingents, differences in organizational cultures, diversity of the host and foreign 
cultures and finally, language barriers, all these comprise a very complicated 
peacekeeping cultural mélange in which CIMIC personnel act on a daily basis. Chapter 
Five presents the impact of tactical level negotiation on CIMIC jobs. Considering the 
nature of CIMIC activities that take part outside of military zones, CIMIC personnel very 
often encounter situations demanding negotiation skills. Similar to previous chapters, 
basic guidelines concerning the skills necessary to a micro-negotiator are discussed. 
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Chapter Six discusses the role of interpreters in the conduct of CIMIC field activities. A 
distinction is made between the professional interpreters and the ones being hired from 
the local communities. Advantages and disadvantages of working with local language 
assistants are discussed. Also, basic hints on how to increase the effectiveness of CIMIC-
interpreter relations are provided. Chapter Six underlines the importance of proper 
education and training for CIMIC personnel. It comprises a set of suggestions which 
should improve CIMIC communication abilities, thus enhancing the effectiveness of 
CIMIC performance in future peacekeeping deployments.  
C. MODERN PEACEKEEPING – KEY DEFINITIONS 
This paper focuses upon UN missions. These include the following, as defined by 
Otunnu and Doyle:7 
Peace enforcement – action with or without the consent of the parties to 
ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council 
acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These 
military forces are comprised of heavily armed, national forces operating 
under the direction of the Secretary General. 
Peacemaking – mediation and negotiations designed to bring hostile 
parties to agreement through peaceful means such as those found in 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, 
mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives 
would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their 
differences. 
Peacekeeping – military and civilian deployments for the sake of 
establishing a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the 
parties concerned, as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce 
between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive 
peace or officials attempt to implement an agreed peace. 
Post-conflict peacebuilding – measures organized to foster economic and 
social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties; 
develop the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future 
violence; and lay the foundations for a durable peace. 
                                                 
7 Definitions taken from Olara A. Otunnu, Michael W. Doyle (ed.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 
for the New Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1998, 2-3. 
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II. CIMIC 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW PEACEKEEPING 
The purpose of this chapter is to present in detail the doctrinal interpretation of 
CIMIC and the essential functions. Comprehensible definition of basic tasks and 
procedures performed by CIMIC personnel in a peacekeeping environment will 
contribute considerably to the better understanding of CIMIC. Challenges connected with 
cooperation and coordination between various organizations and the military in PSOs are 
also discussed in this chapter.  
With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions increased both in number 
and size.8 The first missions, “first generation peacekeeping” as they have been called, 
ranged from several hundred to several thousand troops. These troops were mandated to 
observe, to monitor cease-fires or to separate the fighting parties. Recent peacekeeping 
operations have not only significantly increased the numbers of troops but also expanded 
the range of activities carried out during missions. As Rasmussen points out, the size of 
the force and the kinds of operations undertaken by the peacekeepers are determined “by 
the nature of the mandate and the level of cooperation from the warring parties.”9 In 
order to provide a long lasting and enduring peace, peacekeeping missions had to be 
turned into more nonmilitary-oriented dimensions incorporating human rights education 
and monitoring; supervision of elections; assisting with judicial reform and civil 
administration; training public officials at various levels of government; providing 
humanitarian relief; repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; 
demining; reconciliation; and postconflict reconstruction.10 Thus, the new “second 
generation” of peacekeeping has been labeled “peace operations”; the main task now is 
not only to observe a cease-fire or to separate the warring parties but also to create a 
friendly atmosphere where a durable peace will be possible. 
                                                 
8 J. Lewis Rasmussen in Peacemaking in International Conflict, Methods & Techniques, William 
Zartman, Lewis Rasmussen (ed.), United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, 38. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Quoted in Rasmussen, 38. 
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Rasmussen suggests that accomplishing a modern peace operation requires  
a complex intervention strategy which will focus on nine tactical levels simultaneously. 
Such a multitask approach demands coordinated actions by governments, NGOs, 
business/commerce, private citizens, research/education and training institutes, advocacy 
organizations, religious communities, philanthropic organizations, and the media.11 Only 
collaboration between all these actors present in the modern peacekeeping operations can 
guarantee the effectiveness of the contemporary peacekeepers, and a lasting peace. 
Francis Kofi Abiew in “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations” also 
explains that the end of the Cold War brought the demand for 
“multifunctional/multidimensional peacekeeping” which results in new tasks and the 
need for coordination between civilian and military actors.12 As Abiew suggests, the 
experiences of the last several years prove that the effectiveness of modern peacekeeping 
will depend mainly on the cooperation between the military and civilians. Abiew argues 
that given the nature of the “contemporary conflict management and resolution involving 
military and non-military activities, only a well planned and coordinated combination of 
civilian and military measures can create the conditions for the long-term stability and 
peace in divided societies.”13 To meet these demands, as Abiew mentions, the military, 
for its part, has tried to improve relations with NGOs by trying to create and advance 
Civil-Military Cooperation Centres (CMOCs) and other synchronizing military bodies. 
Moreover, liaison officers have been dispatched to the main NGOs working in the field. 
These cooperation improving steps have helped both sides to better coordinate their 
actions, and also made it much easier to coexist in the complex reality of peace 
operations. In fact, these new developments did not always prove fully effective and the 
results of CMOCs’ actions were rather mixed. However, Abiew sees the effectiveness 
and efficiency of future peace operations through improving these arrangements which 
can serve as valuable models for future missions.14  
                                                 
11 Quoted in Rasmussen, 43. 
12 Francis Kofi Abiew, “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations” in Henry F. Carey, Olivier P. 
Richmond (ed.), Mitigating Conflict, The Role of NGOs, Franc Cass, London, 2003, 24-25. 
13 Ibid., 25. 
14 Ibid., 35. 
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In modern peace operations, achieving a long lasting and enduring peace will 
depend mainly on more non-military oriented dimensions. The number of actors 
participating in new peace operations has increased enormously. Complexity and 
multifunctional types of contemporary peace operations have made the military and 
civilian organizations work closely together which has demanded the creation of CMOCs 
and military liaisons operating closely within the civilian domain. But, there is still much 
to be done and many things to be improved. Very often, because of the lack of 
understanding and field experience, both the military and the civilian organizations 
struggle while dealing with their “partners” in the field.15 The reasons for the lack of 
understanding and the need for better coordination or cooperation between the military 
and the civilian organizations in peace operations will be developed below. 
Jan Eliason in “Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping” also notices the 
significance of the presence of civilian actors in contemporary peace operations. He sees 
humanitarian actions as “one of the three pillars of United Nations action” besides 
peacemaking and peacekeeping and argues that humanitarian assistance should not only 
be provided by civilian organizations but in coordination and cooperation with military 
contingents operating in the field. This collaboration between the military and non-
military actors can only be fruitful and effective if the appropriate arrangements are 
considered in the early planning stages of peacekeeping operations. Eliason also points 
out the importance of integrated training for peacekeeping troops and relief workers.16 
Although the effects of cooperation between the civilian and the military bodies in peace 
operations can be very fruitful, such cooperation can also bring many new problems 
connected with the natures of the two different actors.  
B. THE CHALLENGES OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION 
…there is no natural meeting of minds between civilians and the military: 
it has to be worked up and coordination is hard work on both sides. Both  
 
 
                                                 
15 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training, 
United Nations Publications, New York and Geneva, 1998, 5. 
16 Jan Eliason, „Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping” in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the 
New Century, Olara A. Otunnu, Michael W. Doyle (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1998, 
211-212. 
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sides have different roles, different aims, different motives and, what we 
have to remember, different philosophies, and these need to be reconciled 
one with the other.  
Professor Richard Cohen 
Moscow Seminar, March 199817 
 
During many peace operations civilian and military bodies have cooperated 
fruitfully and harmoniously, but in other cases the inability to achieve a proper level of 
cooperation and coordination critically damaged the efficiency of the mission.18 The 
authors of Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 
1997-2002 suggest that the reasons fall into the so called “CIMIC issue.” It will be very 
useful to follow their suggestions and to define and characterize the major sources of 
cooperation challenges between civilians and the military in the peacekeeping realm. 
Following are several most important obstacles which can dramatically impede the 
effectiveness of civil-military cooperation and coordination in the contemporary 
peacekeeping environment:19 
• Culture – Generally speaking, there is an enormous cultural gap between 
civilian organizations and the military. While civilian organizations can be 
characterized as rather “loosely structured, decentralized, consensus-based 
and, in some cases, anti-bureaucratic and unconventional,” the military 
organizations “are structured, hierarchical, rigid, authoritarian and 
orderly;”20 
• Resources – While the military peacekeeping forces are usually very well 
supplied and quickly deployed, the mechanisms of civilian organizations 
are much slower. Moreover, the humanitarian community is normally 
dependent on financing from and generally supported by donors. So, 
civilians very often need the assistance of the military forces in many 
situations (security, transport, and logistics) – such support needs to be 
coordinated;  
• Authority – Numerous civilian organizations have various authorities at 
various levels of operation. Some of them act as totally independent 
organs, some must report to the Head of Mission; some operate in the 
                                                 
17 Quoted in The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – 
Concluding Report 1997-2002, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002, 143. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 146-148. 
20 Ibid., 146. 
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region and report for guidelines to the strategic level. “Military forces, 
especially those outside the UN chain of command, must report back to 
regional or sub-regional councils in Vienna, Brussels or elsewhere or to 
capitals;”21 and 
• Personalities – Given the personalities’ differences and various length of 
deployment between the military commanders and the civilian 
organizations’ representatives, it is common to encounter problems with 
coordination and cooperation. In addition, civilians as military 
commanders are often poorly prepared for “either the specific mandate, 
for management responsibilities, or for the operational environment.”22 
So, because the realities of contemporary peacekeeping are very complex 
and demand permanent coordination and cooperation, an unprepared 
leader can seriously weaken the ability of both communities acting in the 
field to achieve appropriate goals.   
Misunderstandings are often experienced between civilian organizations and the 
military when working in the field. Because the military and civilian communities often 
lack experience in matters of cooperation, misconceptions and expectations on both sides 
can lead to significant misunderstandings. Here are the most crucial ones: 
• The military sometimes wrongly presumes that NGOs can be tasked, 
while they also have their priorities and clear tasks in mind; also, they are 
responsible to their donors; 
• Civilian organizations also often wrongly expect that the military is there 
to support them. The military have their own and clear objectives, and 
simply cannot be everywhere where NGOs expect them to assist; and 
• Both civilians and the military blame each other for the lack of proper 
preparatory training for the mission. 
Existing dilemmas between the military and civilian “worlds” also seem to play 
an important role in smooth cooperation and coordination in the field. What is crucial is 
that not only the military and humanitarian organizations create these dilemmas. 
Indigenous societies and warring factions can also seriously hamper the effectiveness of 
the whole peacekeeping effort. Here are the main dilemmas which military and civilian 
actors face in modern peacekeeping missions: 
 
                                                 
21 Quoted in The Challenges Project, 147. 
22 Ibid. 
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• As we already know, Civil-Military Cooperation is a necessary tool which 
guarantees that a contemporary peace operation will meet its expected 
goals. Unfortunately, in some examples, the local community or parties to 
a conflict assume that such cooperation should be very limited or perhaps 
non existent; 
• “Peacekeepers generally strive for impartiality whereas humanitarian 
providers often insist on neutrality;”23 
• Most of the civilian actors operate independently, while in many examples 
they ought to cooperate with the military to gain security; 
• The military focuses on the objectives of their mission; civilian 
organizations tend to work for long-term solutions; and 
• Sometimes, on the road to win peoples’ “hearts and minds,” not only the 
military but also humanitarian organizations are doing things “for people 
rather than with people,” forgetting thus, that there should be time for 
building enduring capabilities and capacities.24 
C. CIMIC DOCTRINE 
Changes in the peacekeeping environment where NATO could potentially 
operate, led to the creation of a special military body, Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC), which plays and will play a crucial role in peace operations. Since the new 
demands for the military and the challenges of the civil-military cooperation in 
peacekeeping missions have been discussed previously, it would be useful to focus on 
AJP-9, the NATO CIMIC doctrine. The examination of CIMIC theory will elucidate the 
main priorities of Civil-Military Cooperation. Also, it will be of assistance in appreciating 
the significance of CIMIC involvement in modern peace operations – especially the role 
of CIMIC in facilitating coordination and cooperation between various actors working in 
the field. 
According to MC 411/1, NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, 
the main task for CIMIC is to facilitate cooperation between the military NATO 
component and all elements of the civilian community within the Joint Operations Area 
(JOA). CIMIC is: 
 
                                                 
23 Quoted in The Challenges Project, 148. 
24 Ibid. 
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The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the 
NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and 
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organizations and agencies.25 
D. CIMIC APPLICATION 
The are four factors which form the application of CIMIC: 
• CIMIC activities constitute an integral part of the mission, and are aimed 
at achieving a constant and enduring end-state; 
• CIMIC staff are integrated into the Commander’s Headquarters in order to 
coordinate CIMIC actions in the JOA; 
• NATO forces will, as far as possible and within military capabilities, 
accommodate and support the numerous civilian organizations in the field; 
and 
• “CIMIC activities are carried out with a view to timely transition those 
functions to the appropriate civilian organizations or authorities.”26 
E. THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC 
The NATO CIMIC doctrine clearly points out the importance of civilian actors in 
peace operations and takes into consideration that achieving fruitful cooperation and 
coordination between the military and civilian organizations can be very challenging. 
Another challenge for the military will obviously be the presence of the media and the 
mixture of expectations of “both the international and local communities.”27 Thus, the 
CIMIC doctrine underlines the significance of establishing a net of effective relationships 
with all actors present in the JOA and argues that these relationships and joint planning 
are essential for future conflict resolution. CIMIC should be the military organization 
responsible for “establishing and maintaining” these associations.28 “The long term 
purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the 
achievement of Alliance objectives in operations.”29 To accomplish these goals, AJP-9 
determines several actions undertaken by the CIMIC staff which include: 
                                                 
25 MC 411/1 – the NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, available at: 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm (last visited on 20 November 2006). 
26 AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine, 1-1 to 1-2, available at: 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf (last visited on 13 November 2006). 
27 Ibid., 1-2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 MC 411/1. 
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• having liaison officers on various levels of operation; 
• joint planning engagement at various levels, before as well as during an 
operation (however, it must be noticed, that while such planning 
mechanisms and associations exist, “it may not always be possible to 
conduct them on a formal basis”30); 
• preparing continuous civil environment assessments, thus identifying 
existing vacuums and finding ways to fill them; 
• providing civilian specialists according to the expected needs; 
• working toward “smooth transition;” and 
• cooperating with all staff branches and advising the Commander.31 
Peter Rehse in CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice determined three 
characteristics which apply to the definition and purpose of CIMIC. First, CIMIC, as a 
term, “refers to a military operation and not to the civil-military cooperation as such. The 
military goal remains supreme.”32 Second, facilitating humanitarian aid by NGOs or IOs 
is not an objective for CIMIC. “Third, the definitions imply that CIMIC is rather a 
tactical doctrine, not a strategy.”33 In fact, CIMIC serves only as the Commander’s tool, 
an instrument to achieve the main objectives of the mission.  
F. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
The principles that will be presented here suggest the main ideas for how to create 
and maintain the mutually beneficial civil-military relations with the key civilian 
organizations, civilian authorities, and local populations:34 
• Cultural Awareness – Because even the smallest violation of law or local 
custom can, in politically sensitive areas, lead to a highly hostile attitude 
and questioning of the success of the military mission, one of the key 
CIMIC tasks will be to ensure that the military will acquire a high level of 
awareness concerning local culture, customs and laws.  
 
 
                                                 
30 MC 411/1. 
31 AJP-9, 1-3. 
32 Peter Rehse, CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice, available at: 
http://www.ifsh.de/pdf/publikationen/hb/hb136.pdf (last visited on 13 November 2006), 30. 
33 Ibid. 
34 AJP-9, 2-1. 
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• Common Goals – While the numerous organizations acting within the 
JOA may have different immediate goals, in the long run, on the road of 
strengthening of civil-military relationships, some common objectives can 
be determined.  
• Shared Responsibility – After having established the cooperation of 
civilian organizations, and determined basic common goals, next is to 
create a basis of shared responsibilities. So, to avoid misunderstandings 
and to identify various roles and responsibilities, the role of CIMIC will be 
the establishment of transition mechanisms with the civilian actors acting 
in the JOA.  
• Transparency – Because tensions between political, military and civilian 
actors will often lead to misunderstandings, the role of CIMIC should also 
be to make its activities transparent, demonstrating competence and 
capabilities in resolving problems. Only this open behavior can gain them 
the trust and confidence of the civilian community. Although CIMIC staff 
that enjoy the confidence of civilians may constitute a valuable source of 
intelligence for the Commander, “it must be recognized that the 
information obtained for the purpose of intelligence production cannot 
always be shared with civilian organizations and authorities,”35 because 
the fragile trust can easily be lost.  
• Communication – Permanent communication with the civilian 
environment is essential for achieving and maintaining successful 
cooperation. Cultural differences, prejudices and difficulties with defining 
common goals between military and civilian organizations, can be 
overcome only by maintaining open communication channels. Thus, the 
role of CIMIC personnel will be to establish and to keep open the channels 
of communication with the main civilian organizations acting in the JOA. 
Moreover, it will also be of great importance to encourage the incoming 
actors to become accustomed to the existing communication networks. 
G. CIMIC CORE FUNCTIONS 
As explained earlier, CIMIC constitutes a supportive and integral part of an 
operation. In order to provide the highest possible level of support, the AJP-9 suggests 
various core tasks for CIMIC depending on the stage of the mission. During the pre-
operational stage the CIMIC staff will mainly assist the force in planning actions 
connected with civilian actors existing in the JOA. The role of the CIMIC staff will be to 
make sure all the civilian-related aspects are taken into account during the planning phase 
of operation. These may include, for example:36 
                                                 
35 AJP-9, 2-3. 
36 AJP-9, 3-2. 
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• Political and cultural history; 
• The state of national and local government; 
• Civil administration and services; 
• The needs of the civilian population; 
• The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of IOs and NGOs 
working in the JOA; 
• The mind-set and perceptions of the civilian population; and  
• Economy, commerce and infrastructure. 
The main tasks of CIMIC at the operational stage will be to organize fruitful civil-
military cooperation and establish smooth relationships with civilian bodies in order to 
support the Commander’s mission. The most important CIMIC activities at this stage 
include:37 
• Communication - to achieve effective cooperation there must be constant 
communication functioning at all levels; 
• Information exchange - Passing information back and forth is usually 
mutually fruitful. Information gathered from the civilian environment is 
very often of operational relevance; 
• Coordination – Because numerous actors in the field have various 
cultures, mandates and objectives, the task of CIMIC will be a constant 
coordination of activities at all levels; 
• Facilitating agreements – to support civil-military cooperation, CIMIC 
staff will help in drawing up any formal agreements; and 
• Assessments and conducting CIMIC activities – to meet the immediate 
needs of the local population, or to fill any vacuum existing in the JOA, 
CIMIC is responsible for preparing constant assessments. Although, the 
military will react if vacuums arise “due to the mandated civilian 
authorities’ or the International Community’s temporary inability to fulfill 
these needs.”38 
During the transitional stage of the mission, CIMIC will take part in handing over 
civil activities to the proper, mandated authorities.  
                                                 
37 AJP-9, 3-2, 3-3. 
38 Ibid., 3-3. 
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The NATO AJP-9 CIMIC Doctrine considers CIMIC tasks related to three core 
functions.39 
• Civil-Military Liaison, 
• Support to the civil environment, and 
• Support to the Force 
“Civil-Military Liaison” relates to providing the coordination required during the 
planning phase as well as during operations. The early establishment of civil-military 
relations in the JOA will be a fundamental basis for further fruitful cooperation to 
develop during the mission. A properly organized public information policy will also be 
necessary to facilitate coordination with civil authorities. This can be achieved by 
constant communication of relevant achievements made through CIMIC activities which 
will result in the support of the population and civilian organizations acting in the JOA. 
“Support to the civil environment” is connected to relations with civilian actors 
during a military operation and consists of a wide range of CIMIC activities. Such 
support is not usually conducted under the civilian command and involves the 
engagement of various military resources: information, personnel, material, equipment, 
communication facilities, specialist expertise and training. As the doctrine explains, 
generally, these CIMIC activities will only take place when there is a need to support the 
fulfillment of the Commander’s mission or/and because the proper civil establishment 
and organizations are unable to perform their tasks (because of the lack of resources or 
security). The duration, extent of actions, and all of the political, military and civilian 
factors should be taken into account while making decisions concerning these supporting 
actions. 
“Support to the Force” relates to the situation which requires civil support of the 
military. This aspect of so called Host Nation Support (HNS) has been also explained in 
paragraph 7 of the MC 411/1 the NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation: 
 
 
                                                 
39 AJP-9, 3-3. 
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HNS seeks to provide the NATO Commander and the sending nations 
with support available in the form of material, facilities and services 
including area security and administrative support in accordance with 
negotiated arrangements between the sending nations and/or NATO and 
the host government. 
HNS may also help to reduce the amount of manpower or various logistic 
material which will be required during the next phases of the mission. Also important is 
that, HNS cannot disrupt the local resources’ capacities.  
The military will often require access to local civilian resources. In such 
circumstances every effort will be made to avoid adverse impact on local 
populations, economies, environment, infrastructure or the work of the 
humanitarian organizations.40 
So, one of the main tasks of the CIMIC staff will be monitoring the situation in 
the JOA by preparing constant assessments concerning available resources, acting 
civilian organizations, and their goals and capabilities in the area.  
H. CIMIC GROUPS AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTRES 
(CMOCS) 
Because the structure of the CIMIC component in most cases will depend on the 
requirements of the particular mission, every CIMIC organization should be flexible 
enough to meet these expectations. As the AJP-9 explains, the size and the structure of 
CIMIC staff integrated with HQs will be different depending on the demands of the 
situation. Thus, the main requirement for CIMIC will be keeping a sustainable level of 
prepared staff in order to conduct CIMIC activities in the JOA in different environments.  
1. CIMIC Groups 
A CIMIC Group is, in composition, the biggest CIMIC unit that may be deployed 
as a “part of a national contingent or Allied Joint Force (AJF).”41 A Group HQ, a HQ 
company or a number of CIMIC support companies may constitute the elements of the 
CIMIC Group in the field. The size and a composition of the CIMIC Group will depend 
on the requirements of the particular mission and capabilities of the countries which 
contribute their forces. By conducting CIMIC activities (i.e. preparation of constant 
                                                 
40 Quoted in Rehse, 36. 
41 AJP-9, 5-1. 
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assessments or establishment of CIMIC centers), a CIMIC Group supports the 
Commander in fulfilling his mission. Moreover, there are various functional specialists 
(not only military but also civilian) included in the structure of a CIMIC Group. Again, 
their number, tasks and areas of expertise will depend upon the needs of the mission and 
their availability. Thus, having a wide range of specialists at its disposal, CIMIC Groups 
can provide reliable assessments in the following areas:42 
• Civil Administration, 
• Civil Infrastructure, 
• Humanitarian Aid, 
• Economy and Commerce, and 
• Cultural Affairs. 
Civilian experts within CIMIC structures tend to be more open to considering the 
needs of local authorities and populations and usually approach culturally sensitive 
situations from a different perspective than military personnel. Thus, they can provide a 
link between the two “worlds” and improve communication and cooperation with the 
civilian organizations working in the JOA. 
2. CIMIC Centres - CMOCs 
CIMIC Centres constitute places where civilian organizations, local authorities, 
local representatives and the military can meet and discuss the situation in the JOA. Such 
meetings are a great opportunity for different actors to exchange information, establish 
common goals and areas of responsibilities, and build mutual understanding and trust. 
The best locality for organizing CIMIC Centres is usually outside military zones, 
depending on security matters and availability. When the military arrives after the lead 
IOs and NGOs, it is important for the military to respect the existing lines of cooperation, 
coordination and communication which have already been created in the field, and to try 
to organize CIMIC Centres close to where the HQs of the lead civilian agencies are 
located. The following are the key functions of CIMIC Centres:43 
 
                                                 
42 AJP-9, 5-1. 
43 Ibid., 5-3. 
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• Provide initial points of contact, 
• Provide a focal point for liaison, 
• Facilitate information exchange, 
• Provide advice on the availability and mechanics of military assistance to 
civilian organizations, and 
• Reinforce the legitimacy of the Force in the eyes of civil authorities and 
the local population. 
I. CIMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH HUMANITARIAN ACTORS 
Having covered the main CIMIC definitions, tasks and applications, the basics of 
the main civilian actors in peace operations should also be appropriately developed. 
Civilian players can be responsible for a very wide range of activities such as 
humanitarian aid, human rights, minorities protection, refugees and internally displaced 
persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, arts, 
sciences and general project funding.44 So, as the AJP-9 suggests, to achieve fruitful 
cooperation, it is crucial for CIMIC personnel to fully understand the mandate, role, 
structure, methods and principles that guide these organizations. More than just the 
military point of view be presented in this part. Using approaches from military doctrines 
and also from humanitarian publications should serve as a step toward better 
understanding of how CIMIC is seen by the civilian community working in the field, and 
what the demands of the civilian environment toward the military to improve the existing 
relationships are.   
J. TYPES OF CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
The NATO CIMIC doctrine underlines the importance and the multiplicity of 
civilian actors present in the JOA. To clarify the relationships with the civilian 
environment and to increase the level of mutual understanding, the AJP-9 distinguishes 
four key types of civilian organizations.45 
1. International Organizations (IOs) 
IOs are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the 
international level. Their tasks are basically connected with humanitarian relief and they 
                                                 
44 AJP-9, 8-1. 
45 See AJP-9, Chapter 8. 
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act under the “umbrella” of the UN. The main contemporary IOs include: UN High 
Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA), the World Food Program (WFP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).46 The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) constitutes the exception among these organizations. Unlike those 
mentioned above, the ICRC was not created by intergovernmental agreements but 
performs its activities according to the Geneva Conventions.47 The main task of the 
ICRC is the protection of the lives and dignity of war victims; the core principles guiding 
this organization are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. 
2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization defines NGOs as voluntary and usually 
not government-funded organizations. They act as non-profit organizations and remain 
completely independent of governments, UN agencies or other IOs. The number of 
NGOs has increased over time. Because of their political neutrality, they have proven to 
be very effective; their actions can bring great benefit where political battles have failed. 
There are two categories of NGOs: 
• Mandated: These NGOs are officially recognized by the lead international 
organization in a crisis and are authorized to operate in the area. 
• Non-Mandated: These NGOs do not enjoy official recognition or 
authorization. Thus, they primarily work as private concerns. Non-
mandated NGOs can be contracted or sub-contracted by an IO or a 
mandated NGO; otherwise, their funds come from private enterprises and 
individuals. 
3. International and National Donor Agencies 
These agencies are responsible for the funding, monitoring and evaluation of 
development programs. The lead IOs should ideally be responsible for the coordination 
of the actions of these organizations.  
Also worthy of mention are organizations mainly specialized in reconstruction 
work (e.g. the UN Development Program – UNDP). Representatives of these 
                                                 
46 AJP-9, 8-1. 
47 Rehse, 34. 
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organizations usually have spent a longer time in the JOA than the military, thus having 
greater expertise concerning the needs of the local infrastructure. So, the role of CIMIC 
personnel will be to coordinate the exchange of experience and knowledge between these 
experts and local authorities in order to create the most encouraging conditions for the 
reconstruction projects in the JOA.  
K. LEAD AGENCIES 
The lead agency has been mandated by the international community to “initiate 
the coordination of the activities of civilian organizations, which volunteer to participate 
in an operation.”48 It is usually a key UN agency such as UNHCR, UNICEF or OCHA. 
Because the main task of the lead agency is to gather information about civilian 
organizations acting in the area and to coordinate the activities of these organizations, it 
is of great importance for CIMIC staff to encourage the members of the lead agency to 
facilitate and maintain effective cooperation with the military. Thus, as the NATO 
CIMIC doctrine suggests, the relationship between the lead agency and the military is of 
great significance. According to the AJP-9, specific tasks of a lead agency are: 
• to serve as a point of contact for other agencies (planning and information 
sharing); 
• to coordinate activities in order to avoid duplication of effort or wasting 
resources; and 
• to link the civilian organizations with the military.49 
L. CORE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
As was mentioned earlier in the case of the ICRC, humanitarian assistance must 
be provided according to the three main principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality. For better understanding of the civilian organizations acting in the JOA, it 
will be very useful to present these key definitions.50 
 
                                                 
48 AJP-9, 8-3. 
49 Ibid., 8-4. 
50 Definitions taken from Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support 
United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003, available at: 
http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines (last visited on 20 November 2006). 
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Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with 
particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as 
children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must 
be respected and protected. 
Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging 
in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or 
ideological nature. 
Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without 
discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, 
race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and 
priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress. 
Indeed, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality guide the actions of 
the humanitarian community across the world. The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued a document which explains all the key 
issues related to humanitarian relief and to what degree and in which way the civilian 
organizations should cooperate with the military in complex emergencies.  
Peter Rehse in CIMIC: Concepts, Definitions and Practice noticed that there is 
much confusion in the contemporary peacekeeping reality concerning CIMIC 
terminology. As he explains, the increasing number of civil-military interactions has 
resulted in the multiplying of CIMIC concepts throughout various actors coexisting in the 
field. The use of the CIMIC concept among numerous organizations, and the lack of 
consistency in perception, led to confusion and misunderstanding. Rehse argues that such 
a situation is understandable because, considering the multiple natures and cultures 
involved, it is impossible to define CIMIC activities under one encompassing term.51 
The author says that in the last years of international intervention, the need to include 
CIMIC in peacekeeping missions has increased enormously. Such situations demanded 
from NATO the creation of a complete new CIMIC doctrine, procedures and 
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civilian organizations to develop their own CIMIC terminology in order to separate and 
differentiate their actions from those of NATO.52 This is, for instance, how UNOCHA 
defines CIMIC activities: 
Civil-Military Coordination: The essential dialogue and interaction 
between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is 
necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid 
competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue 
common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. 
Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common 
training.53 
This definition clearly shows the objectives of Civil-Military Coordination in 
peacekeeping from the civilian community perspective. For the military, CIMIC units are 
responsible for the smooth cooperation and coordination of civilian and military efforts 
which will positively influence the mission’s outcomes. For the civilian agencies, on the 
other hand, Civil-Military Coordination is exclusively related to humanitarian 
emergencies and is entirely focused on delivering humanitarian aid without endangering 
basic humanitarian principles described above. Moreover, according to the definition, 
Civil-Military Coordination from the civilian agencies’ perspective may range from 
peaceful co-existence to fruitful cooperation.  
M. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN PRACTICE – THE 
HUMANITARIAN APPROACH 
Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies repeatedly underlines the 
importance of fruitful cooperation with the military in peace operations; but, at the same 
time, points out that the military must be familiar with the core humanitarian principles.54 
As the authors of the document suggest, civil-military coordination should be “a shared 
responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various 
levels of intensity and form.”55 Moreover, it is also important to differentiate two kinds 
of relationships between the military and civilian organizations. First, when there are no 
                                                 
52 Rehse, 15-16. 
53 Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, An Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
Working Group (IASC-WG) Reference Paper, 28 June 2004, available at: 
http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines (last visited on 15 November 2006), 5. 
54 Ibid., 6. 
55 Ibid.  
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common goals defined, the relationship should be described as a peaceful co-existence, 
where the two actors try to minimize competition and conflict, in order to allow the other 
to do their job without disruption. Second, in the case where there are common goals and 
strategies established between the military and humanitarian community, “cooperation 
may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives.”56 
Some practical guidelines considering civil-military coordination will be 
presented in this section. All issues will be discussed according to Civil-Military 
Relationship in Complex Emergencies and will concern the approach taken by 
humanitarian workers. 
1. Liaison Arrangements 
The authors of Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies consider the 
significance of ensuring proper lines of communication between civilians and the military 
at every possible level and at the earliest possible stage of the operation. Such 
arrangements help in the effective exchange of information, before and during military 
engagement in the mission. The paper suggests, at the same time, that proper preparation 
for UN humanitarian personnel is also of great importance, and gives the examples of 
courses conducted for civilians to meet the required level of preparation for the mission.  
2. Exchange of Information 
The Civil Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies clearly states in the 
beginning of this paragraph that only that information which cannot endanger human 
lives or the perception of impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations can be 
shared. However, as it is further explained, some information exchange will be necessary 
in order to fulfill humanitarian tasks and bring relief to those in need. These are the areas 
of information which may be shared: security, humanitarian locations, humanitarian 
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3. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations 
As the Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies argues, “the use of 
military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be exceptional and only as a 
last resort.”57 Presented are the four conditions under which military assets can be used 
by humanitarian actors:58 
• Unique capability – alternative civilian resources do not exist; 
• Timeliness – there is a demand for an immediate action; 
• Clear humanitarian distinction – civilian control over the use of military 
assets. In this case, it is important to understand that while the military 
assets will be still controlled by the military, the humanitarian agency will 
be responsible for the whole operation; and 
• Time-limited – the use is clearly limited in time and scale. 
4. Should the Military Conduct Relief Operations? 
From the point of view of the humanitarian community, armed forces should be 
strongly discouraged from conducting humanitarian actions. Military relief operations, 
even when their purpose is purely humanitarian, can seriously damage the overall 
humanitarian action taken by civilian agencies in the JOA. It is suggested that the 
military focus primarily on security matters, which will essentially enable humanitarian 
assistance and contribute to the enduring and stable peace in the region. However, under 
some exceptional circumstances, temporary humanitarian relief can be provided by the 
military.  
Raj Rana in Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-Military Relationship: 
Complementarity or Incompatibility?59 describes the current state of relations between 
civilian organizations – mainly those of ICRC – and the military. All the core principles 
                                                 
57 Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, 13. Last resort is defined as follows: Military 
assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of 
military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in 
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58 Ibid., 13. 
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and assumptions regarding civil-military relations in humanitarian operations (from the 
point of view of the ICRC) can be found in the quoted statement provided at the 
beginning of the paper.60 The author of the statement underlines the importance of 
maintaining clear distinctions between humanitarian and military operations. Moreover, 
the ICRC agrees that the military may provide humanitarian relief as a last resort; but, at 
the same time, their wish is to avoid blurring lines between humanitarian actions and the 
core goals assigned for the military mission.  
Using examples from the contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Raj 
explains that the nature of current military operations has humanitarian actions integrated 
with the broader domain of military actions. The military frequently started using 
humanitarian relief operations to support their mission by winning “hearts and minds” of 
the local authorities and populations. Additionally, these actions also served as a “force 
multiplication” and “force protection.”61  
Raj also notices that the contemporary range of military activities has become 
surprisingly wide – “the military is able to jump from waging war to peacekeeping to 
humanitarian assistance on the same day, at times within the same city.”62 She also 
predicts that the future role of embedded civilian experts into military structures will 
systematically increase. To face these new phenomena, Raj argues, the humanitarian 
community must accept the current roles of the military, and put greater emphasis on 
civil-military relations. This is where she sees the growing role of CIMIC and Civil 
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Affairs (CIMIC/CA).63 Raj presents its role from the humanitarian community 
perspective this way:64 
• As the link which provides unity of effort between the military and the 
civilian actors operating in the field (local authorities, population, NGOs, 
IOs); 
• As the military tool which monitors and influences the humanitarian 
conditions in the JOA; 
• CIMIC/CA personnel play the role of “humanitarian diplomats and 
conscience of their Commander;”65 
• As one of the non-combat tools employed by the Commander to win the 
mission’s objectives; and 
• CIMIC/CA humanitarian projects are almost the same as those conducted 
by humanitarian agencies. 
This is how the ICRC understands its priorities concerning possible cooperation 
and/or relations with the military:66 
• Human dignity and saving lives are essential and leading terms for the 
ICRC. Political and military considerations cannot constitute the principal 
directives. 
• From the ICRC’s point of view, the primary goal for the military should 
be to provide security and order in the JOA. 
• Although the ICRC understands the need for consultation and cooperation 
with the military at every possible level of operations, it also underlines 
the importance of maintaining its independence for decisions and tasks.   
While Raj seems to be concerned that the blurring of roles and players in the field 
can create the wrong perception of “taking sides” by civilian workers, thus endangering  
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64 Raj, 9-10. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 25. These can be found in “ICRC Guidelines for civil-military relations” included in Raj’s 
paper as an appendix.  
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their lives and jeopardizing the goals of humanitarian actions, she sees a better future of 
contemporary complex interventions in improving the cooperation between the military 
and civilian actors.  
Contemporary Peace Support Operations (PSOs) showed that only by effective 
cooperation between civilian and military actors working in the JOA can the desired end-
state be achieved. Unfortunately, because of several significant barriers dividing the two 
different “cultural worlds,” there is still much to be done to make such cooperation fully 
effective and enduring. 
Although both the military and the humanitarian communities seem to understand 
that building mutual understanding, cooperation and effective coordination between the 
two different types of organizations could be the only way to achieve the goals of the 
mission, the humanitarian community appears to be more reluctant to get into closer 
partnerships with the military acting in the JOA. Presumably, this is the result of concerns 
related to the risk of losing credibility and trust in the eyes of local authorities and 
populations. Humanitarian agencies are primarily focused on the three core principles, 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality, which must guide their actions and guarantee the 
safe conduct of their mission. As it is proposed in the Civil-Military Relationship in 
Complex Emergencies, “the risk of compromising humanitarian operations by 
cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, 
agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-
military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances.”67 Technically well-prepared, 
experienced and competent CIMIC personnel can serve as an interface between all actors 
in the JOA as a way of improving mutual understanding and negotiating this acceptance 
with the local governments and/or communities.   
The authors of Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination 
with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations, suggest several relevant 
areas of action which should significantly improve civil-military relationships:68 
                                                 
67 Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, 10. 
68 Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman, Strengthening the 
Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian 
Operations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000, 141. 
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• The military should be educated about the main humanitarian agencies. 
This, in the long term, should increase the mutual understanding while 
decreasing current tensions. 
• Exchange of information between the military and the humanitarian 
community should be improved. 
• All actions should be better planned (long-term planning) and coordinated 
by both military and civilian agencies. 
There are probably many helpful “remedies” which could facilitate effective civil-
military cooperation in peacekeeping. The author of Challenges of Peace Operations: 
Into the 21st Century presented, for example, a much wider spectrum of actions and a 
more detailed set of guidelines which should be addressed to make civil-military relations 
smoother. Besides those listed above, it is suggested to the military and civilian 
organizations to start building fruitful cooperation on common values and concerns 
which must be clearly determined. The awareness of common goals should effectively 
improve mutual understanding and strengthen the effectiveness of both communities. 
Apart from that, as the authors explain, there is the need for improving cooperation on all 
levels, not only between military and civilian organizations, but also between various 
civilians working in the JOA.69 
Nothing creates more misunderstanding, generates more emotion and 
results in more confusion in modern peacekeeping than the subject of 
civil-military relations; yet nothing, absolutely nothing, is more important 
to successful peacekeeping in the new millennium than the cooperation 
and coordination between the principal contributors to a peacekeeping 
mission, military and non-military.  
David Lightburn 
Buenos Aires Seminar, August 200170 
 
It seems obvious that the role of CIMIC in future Peace Support Operations 
(PSOs) will be increasing. Because of the complexity of contemporary PSOs, 
humanitarian agencies are not the only ones responsible for humanitarian relief 
operations. So, in order to improve the coordination of both military and civilian 
                                                 
69 The Challenges Project, 150. 
70 Quoted in Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century – Concluding Report 1997-2002, 
145. 
 29
organizations’ efforts, multiple players have to accept and understand the objectives of 
their counterparts, and special arrangements such as mutual training, dispatching liaison 
officers and continuous cooperation must be made. Moreover, education for both the 
military and civilian community will also play an important role. By understanding their 
counterparts in peacekeeping, military and civilian “worlds” can significantly improve 
mutual cooperation, effectively decrease the number of misunderstandings and notably 
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III. CIMIC-MEDIA RELATIONSHIPS 
A. MEDIA-MILITARY TENSIONS AND RELATIONS DURING ARMED 
CONFLICT 
There is a natural tension between the media and the government, and in 
particular the military. This is good. There should be tension. It is a part of 
the checks and balances system of the country... The press is very 
important to the well-being of the nation.  
General Bernard E. Trainor71 
 
Indeed, when discussing military-media relations, it is very difficult to disagree 
with Trainor’s opinion. The public’s right to know clearly explains the nature of 
contemporary military-media’s tense relations. The journalist wants to tell a story that 
will be interesting and credible, usually irrespective of the outcome; the military, on the 
other hand, is in pursuit of national goals following specific tasks assigned by political 
leaders. Moreover, the military always has to consider the aspect of operational secrecy; 
some information simply cannot be shared with the media because they could badly 
damage the effectiveness of military tasks conducted within the mission. To present a 
complete picture of differences between the military and media worlds, it will be very 
helpful to look at a table constructed according to Trainor’s explanations:72 
 
SOLDIER JOURNALIST 
Team player Independent 







Table 1.   Trainor’s definitions of military and media actors in the field 
                                                 
71 General Bernard E. Trainor, Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-
Media Relations, University of California, Berkeley, 1995, 27. 
72 Ibid., 29. 
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So, while the goals of the two institutions are different, and the culture so 
distinctively makes the two actors different, to achieve fruitful cooperation or even 
peaceful co-existence between the military and the media in the present military 
interventions can be very difficult. Nevertheless, because of the great power of the media 
related to unlimited capabilities of showing stories and shaping opinions, not only 
internationally but also locally, it is crucial for the military to build a successful and 
permanent relationship with journalists acting in the JOA. Moreover, the force must 
realize that in the globalized character of contemporary military interventions, the media 
will accompany military peace operations everywhere, irrespective of the decisions of 
military commanders. So, it will be the role of the military to find a way to create good 
cooperation with the media and to provide them with reliable information which will 
show the military peacekeeping effort in a positive light.73   
The media is a critical track in a holistic peacebuilding system because it 
can assist in reconstructing a common history, preventing enemy imaging, 
focusing public attention on violations of individual, political and human 
rights, and by getting protagonists to the table. The present electronic age 
is shaping civilization in an image of “Tribal Village.”74 
Elizabeth C. Hanson in “The Media, Foreign Policymaking, and Political 
Conflict” explains the role of the media in contemporary international relations. She 
asserts that in today’s reality the media is capable of being very influential, even capable 
of pushing governments to action. To support the argument, Hanson brings up the story 
of Somalia, when the permanent TV coverage of humanitarian crises captured the 
attention of public institutions and, thus, compelled the “government into a policy of 
intervention for humanitarian reasons.”75  
                                                 
73 Marjan Malesic, Peace Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia, 
Stockholm 2000, available at: http://www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se/444.epibrw (last visited on 04 
December 2006), 9-11. 
74 Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham (ed.), Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Frank Cass, 
London 2000, 107. 
75 Elizabeth C. Hanson, “The Media, Foreign Policymaking, and Political Conflict,” Mershon 
International Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 1. (May 1998), 157.  
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Hanson deals with media-military and media-policy makers’ relations in peace 
operations because, as she suggests, they are very challenging for policy makers for 
several crucial reasons: 
• There is an essential difference between conventional war and a peace 
operation. Defining expected end-states, enemies or outcomes may 
become very difficult. 
• Because there are no clearly defined adversaries, it is difficult to justify 
involvement with national security arguments; also, is it hard to obtain 
public support and give good reasons for casualties. 
• Finally, PSOs usually draw more media attention than conventional wars. 
Moreover, it is easier for the media to act in the JOA and get the information, 
because they cannot be restricted by the regulations connected with national security 
matters. Additionally, given the multi-organizational character of peace operations, where 
enormous actors such as IOs and NGOs are involved, it is more likely that the media 
presence will be noticeable.76  
In this way, policy makers’ efforts to communicate and gain the support for their 
peacekeeping policies seem to be very difficult. A good way to send a desired message to 
the people and to build credibility and support for their policies would be, for the policy 
makers, to seek good relationships with the media.  
Editor’s demands for quick and constant information from the field constitute 
another very important factor which makes contemporary military interventions more 
difficult. To provide reliable and accurate information, journalists acting in the JOA need 
to have more time. Unfortunately, the pressure to be faster than others and the need to 
fulfill the task usually takes precedence over accuracy, thus complicating the whole peace 
process. Moreover, peacekeeping forces also have to deal with a “deliberate 
misrepresentation of the UN activities” which became a new instrument of war in 
Rwanda and the countries of former Yugoslavia.77 Thus, as Goulding suggests, the 
peacekeeping force has to have its own capacity from the early days of arrival to the 
JOA, to communicate with the local and international media in order to provide the news, 
                                                 
76 Hanson, 159. 
77 Marrack Goulding in Ingrid A. Lehmann, Peacekeeping and Public Information, Frank Cass, 
London 1999, xi-xii. 
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combat disinformation and persuade the audience about the clear-cut goals and efforts of 
the UN peacekeeping forces.  This is the role of CIMIC personnel with the cooperation 
and advice of Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) working with every peacekeeping force to 
contribute to improving the relations with media, thus reaching the local and international 
audience. 
Due to the media’s ability to shape public opinion locally and internationally, 
active support for the military’s missions by the media should always be sought. Instant 
images flowing from the JOA influence public perception of UN activities and thus have 
a decisive role in the public’s understanding of the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts. 
Thus, media’s role in peace operations can no longer be ignored. Moreover, negative 
reporting from the JOA no doubt affects the entire picture of PSO in the eyes of the 
international audience and policy makers and in this way has an impact on the whole 
peace process.78 So, UN peacekeeping forces, especially through PAOs and CIMIC, must 
cooperate closely with both the local and international media to show their actions in a 
positive light, resulting in the understanding and support of their activities by the public. 
Additionally, to avoid misinterpretation and negative framing of UN activities, the media 
should feel relatively free and the information should be provided following a clear 
protocol.79 
B. MEDIA – PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Since the previous section underlined the importance of the media in 
contemporary peacekeeping missions and pointed out how crucial media are when we 
consider their huge capabilities in influencing public opinion, the next paragraphs will 
deal with more specific spheres of military-media relations in PSOs. Because most 
officers are not accustomed to talking to the media and giving interviews in front of 
cameras, microphones or even when providing statements to newspapers,80 some 
practical guidelines and suggestions concerning dealing with the media in the field will 
                                                 
78 Goulding in Ingrid A. Lehmann, 2-3. 
79 Jennifer Kay Woofter, Media Restrictions in United Nations Peacekeeping, Master of Arts Thesis, 9 
August 2000, Blacksburg, Virginia, available at: http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-11272000-
114350/unrestricted/jw-modified.pdf (last visited on 4 December 2006), 103-104. 
80 “Media and the Military,” Joint Services Warrant Officers’ Course document, available at: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uk/jswoc_chap7.doc (last visited on 4 December 2006). 
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be presented. These basic clues should enrich the military’s knowledge of media, helping 
to understand media’s goals and protocols. Only by promoting mutual understanding will 
the military be able to employ the power of information to our shared advantage. 
Moreover, the fundamental interviewing principles will hopefully assist soldiers when 
confronting media during military operations. The military should always be well 
prepared to tell its story; positively shaping the image of UN peacekeepers’ activities will 
remain of great importance in the future.  
My own Press conferences convinced me that television had added an 
extra dimension to the conduct of modern warfare: commanders in the 
future will have to be trained to handle it, but also to allow enough time 
and resources for it to be used to the fullest advantage. For someone like 
myself, who had deliberately kept a low profile… it was a strange and 
unnerving experience to stand in front of the cameras. Yet television is 
something that the modern commander cannot ignore. 
General Sir Peter De La Billiere – Storm Command81 
 
Because the number of media that accompany the military in international 
interventions has significantly increased over the last several years, soldiers participating 
in peacekeeping missions must always be prepare for meeting the media. About 700 
journalists were embedded with U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. There were 
also more than 2,000 independent journalists who covered combat operations on their 
own.82 Media were present almost everywhere, soldiers had to share the information, 
often without particular preparation for the interview. Even if the results of the 
information that the military provides are not always predictable and not necessarily 
fruitful for the military, it is the role of the force to keep the press well informed. “Bad 
news does not improve with age and the mere appearance of with-holding or 
manipulation can destroy our credibility” – this is how U.S. Air Force Public Affairs 
Center of Excellence underlines the importance of providing true and timely news.83 
 
                                                 
81 Quoted in “Media and the Military.” 
82 Meeting the Media, U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence, 15 October 2003, available 
at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pace/meetingmedia.pdf (last visited on 2 December 2006), 3. 
83 Ibid., 4. 
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C. EMBEDDED MEDIA 
The history of military-media relations can be split between times of fruitful 
cooperation and hatred. While media personnel always look for the good source of 
information which will draw public opinion’s attention, the military tries to limit the 
outflow of information for security reasons. The Vietnam and Gulf Wars represent two 
very interesting examples worth noting. Though the policy makers’ approach toward the 
media significantly differed in those cases, in final summary, the military-media relations 
noticeably deteriorated.84 So, having in mind lessons learned from previous conflicts, the 
policy makers had to understand that only developing a new strategy on dealing with the 
media would improve cooperation in the field. The new approach had to be balanced 
between unlimited access to the battlefield and the huge limitations for the media during 
the Gulf War. As a result of these new thoughts, “in October 2002, Clarke and Whitman 
developed a plan to assign or “embed” reporters with the troops.”85 Some preliminary 
trials with embedding press staff with the troops were conducted during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and proved to be successful. The new conflict in Iraq 
in 2003 let the media and military fully develop the embedding strategy which resulted in 
accuracy and efficiency of providing the news from the battlefield. This policy was built 
on shared understanding and mutual respect between the military and journalists; both 
sides were encouraged to take part in joint training and field exercises before the 
deployment.86 Some additional comments related to joint training and building trust and 
understanding between the media and military will be developed in the section devoted to 
training. 
But how does the issue of embedded journalists relate to the question of post-
conflict activities, and how important is the role of effective embedding during Peace 
Support Operations? As Rodriguez explains, while embedded press coverage worked 
                                                 
84 For detailed information about the military-media relations in Vietnam see Daniel C. Hallin The 
Uncensored War, University of California Press, 1989; General Bernard E. Trainor, Military Perspectives 
on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations, University of California, Berkeley, 1995; for 
Gulf War see Susan L. Carruthers The Media at War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000; David Benjamin 
Censorship in the Gulf, Auburn University, Alabama, 1995.  
85 Jose L. Rodriguez, Embedding Success into the Military-Media Relationship, Available at: 
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/rodriguez.pdf (last visited on 4 December 2006). 
86 Ibid. 
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perfectly during the military operation, later on, when the war was over and embedded 
journalists left their units, reporting from the field significantly decreased, which caused a 
drop in public support – both local and international – for stabilization forces. Bloody 
incidents started to dominate popular news, spoiling the positive images from the early 
stages of conflict. “With the loss of the embedded journalists, and no American-led/Iraqi-
run television news outlet to cover the positive developments in Iraq, the information 
advantage enjoyed during combat operations eroded.”87 In addition, as Rodriguez 
explains, because the U.S. forces did not organize a local TV station with Arabic 
speaking reporters, there was no possibility of showing the public the positive images of 
post-conflict activities conducted by the stabilization force. 
Rodriguez also presents the shortcomings connected with media operations during 
military operations in Iraq. These were underlined during the U.S. Army War College 
Embedded Media Conference in September 2003.88 One of the main conclusions was 
related to the fact that the media left their troops too early, impairing the functioning of 
the whole information campaign machinery, and significantly diminishing public support 
for the stabilization part of the operation. Also underlined was that “reporters should be 
embedded with Civil Affairs (CA) units specifically to cover activities involving 
civilians”89 and all the positive images related with CA activities which could support 
stabilization efforts of the military force.  
D. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE 
Not only well prepared personnel working for the PAO will be responsible for all 
the preparations and contacts in which the media will be involved. One of the most 
important roles of the PAO will be to prepare all military personnel to deal with the 
media. Because CIMIC personnel act as independent units, very often outside military 
compounds, meeting with local authorities, individual contractors or various International 
and Non-Governmental Organizations assisting in bringing humanitarian relief or doing  
 





small reconstruction projects in the JOA, it will be more likely that CIMIC officers will 
face the media. Here is some practical advice concerning the areas in which soldiers can 
rely on PAOs:90 
• PAO personnel can advise if the planned interview is authorized or proper; 
• Given the area of the interview, PAO staff can predict questions likely to 
be asked; 
• PAO personnel can prepare the place and the ground rules of the proposed 
interview; 
• Monitoring and even taping the interview can be also provided by PAO 
staff; and  
• Besides the role of liaison with the news representatives, PAO officers 
may provide post-interview feedback. 
E. BEING INTERVIEWED  
As it is suggested in Meeting the Media, while the military is usually rather 
reluctant to talk to the media, properly transmitted information can correct the record, 
fight critics or answer accusations, and, of course, tell the positive news considering, for 
instance, the great performance of the peacekeeping force. The interviewed person, 
basically, has no control over what questions will be asked, but can always control what 
will be said during an interview. The cardinal rule of the interview is that there is “no 
such thing as an “off-the-record” interview”91 – everything that is said when you talk to 
the media can be reported; the camera and/or a tape recorder may always be “on.” Area 
of responsibility and competence is also very important for the person who will be 
interviewed. It is proper to rethink the idea of a planned interview and determine if the 
domain of the topic might require involvement of the superior. The interviewed person 




                                                 
90 Meeting the Media, 5. 
91 Ibid., 6. 
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It is important to be kind when talking to the media. Hostility and distancing 
toward media will surely result in a very similar approach. Interviewed military personnel 
who are polite and understand journalists’ goals and protocol, will create credibility and 
fruitful cooperation. There are some guidelines which should be considered by the 
interviewed person:92 
• Your statements should be short, simple and specific. At the same time, do 
not answer with “yes” or “no” which may cause the impression that you 
are rude and uncooperative. Take breaks after every answer; journalist 
should lead the interview and ask further questions; 
• Do not discuss issues that are not of your domain. Try to avoid 
speculations; 
• Because you do not have to tell everything that you know (for instance for 
security reasons) – admit it overtly; 
• Do not hurry with your answers. Do not use “no comment” which usually 
causes mistrust and a feeling that you do not want to cooperate; 
• Try to bind your answers to real-life examples, which will help your 
audience in understanding what you are talking about; 
• When facing a multi-layer question, try to relate only to that part which 
allows you to make a positive statement, leave the remaining or 
troublesome issues of the question. If the journalist is unsatisfied with 
your answer, he/she will restate the question; 
• Using and repeating so called “color words” (“deaths”, “massacre”, 
“scandal”) is not suggested. By producing negative association, these 
words my become counterproductive to the objectives of the interview; 
• Do not be a mirror of your interviewer’s mood; when he/she behaves 
rudely – be polite and stay calm. The people’s attention will always be 
focused on the interviewed person, not on the journalist; 
• Avoid using military acronyms which can cause confusion or 
misunderstandings; speaking with jargon or military technical language is 
also discouraged. It is necessary to use an approachable language; 
• Never lie or implicitly show that you are hiding something. Make your 
statements reliable, complete and competent. Always remember that you 
are talking not only for yourself and the picture you create reaches beyond 
the military compounds; and  
• Do not restate unreliable data or terms presented by the reporter. If you 
know the real facts, gently clarify; if you know that these facts are not                                                  
92 Meeting the Media, 8-9. Although all the suggestions were specified for the Air Force personnel, 
they have a universal application and may be used in every situation by any kind of military personnel. 
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proven – admit it. Public opinion must see that you clarified the 
questionable facts, or explained that some data are not accurate. By not 
reacting to unverified data, the audience may later associate them with 
your person.  
Talking with the media is very important for the success of contemporary 
peacekeeping. It is necessary to create good relations with the media and provide them 
with reliable news which will positively influence the vision of the whole peacekeeping 
effort in the eyes of both locals and the international audience. Ross Howard in An 
Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding93 presents the media as a double-
edged sword. While, by framing the news, the media can contribute to the creation of a 
bad picture of the peacebuilding effort, which can result in a decrease in international 
support for the mission; it can, at the same time, affect the peace process very positively. 
There is a bright side to the media, in Howard’s view. He argues that it can be “an 
instrument of conflict resolution,... it can uphold accountability and expose 
malfeasance,... enable a society to make well-informed choices, which is the precursor of 
democratic governance, and reduce conflict and foster security.”94 Thus, given all these 
advantages, we cannot ignore the power of the media and must be prepared to meet and 
cooperate with them in the field. 
F. CIMIC AND THE MEDIA IN PEACEKEEPING 
As was explained earlier, meeting with media in the contemporary international 
military interventions will not only be a matter for well prepared PAO personnel. 
Because of the multilateral approach and diplomatic effort of Peace Support Operations, 
the multinational character of the force engaged in the mission, the involvement of 
numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the unavoidable 
presence of the media, the possibility of meeting the media in the field is very likely. 
CIMIC personnel, who usually conduct their activities outside of the military zones 
meeting with numerous civilian actors acting in the JOA, will be especially likely to 
contact the media. Because the essential task of CIMIC in peacekeeping is creating and 
managing the communication between peacekeepers and the host country, there will be 
                                                 
93 Ross Howard, An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding, IMPACS – Institute for 
Media and Civil Society, Canada 2002, available at: 
http://commonsense.epfl.ch/Resources/Media/impacs.pdf (last visited on 2 December 2006). 
94 Ibid. 
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various meetings with the local authorities or tribal leaders organized at CMOCs or other 
places situated outside the military compounds. Such gatherings are great opportunities 
for the media to get the news; at the same time, these meetings and the news reported by 
the media can also help in communication between the peacekeeping force and the local 
community. So, the role of CIMIC officers will also be to create a positive image of the 
peacekeeping effort by providing reliable news to the media – which media will always 
desire. 
Indeed, “the interaction between peacekeepers, on the one hand, and the host 
country, on the other” constitutes the “vital aspect of the communications process in 
peacekeeping missions.”95 Thus, CIMIC staff by organizing CMOCs or CIMIC houses 
try to reach the local population. What is especially vital for the view of the peacekeeping 
force in the eyes of the local communities is CIMIC personnel cooperating with IOs, 
NGOs and local contractors, conducting various quick impact infrastructure 
reconstruction projects, thus making the lives of locals easier. Inger Skjelsbaek in “The 
NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Military Intervention Facing 
New Civilian Challenges” discusses civil-military relations during the mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, pointing out the importance of CIMIC. Skjelsbaek explains CIMIC 
activities that had been conducted in the region. He gives the examples of the quick 
impact projects and other enterprises organized by CIMIC staff which include: building 
schools, “helping displaced people” and organizing CIMIC houses where the local people 
can come and discuss their problems.96 Again, such news as the opening of a new school 
that has been built in the mutual effort of the local community and peacekeepers, or a 
spectacular and well organized assistance to the displaced persons, represent very good 
material for the media. It is the role of CIMIC personnel to understand the need of close 
cooperation with the media in order to tell the good story to the public, which in turn will 
positively impact the perception of the whole peacekeeping effort in the region.  
 
                                                 
95 Lehmann, 17. 
96 Inger Skjelsbaek, “The NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Military 
Intervention Facing New Civilian Challenges,” available at: 
http://www.prio.no/files/file45003_chapter_3.pdf (last visited on 2 December 2006). 
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Constructive outcomes of the combined efforts of the locals, military and the media will 
create trust and a feeling of success, thus generating great encouragement for future 
cooperation. 
G. TOWARD BETTER MILITARY-MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 
For Jennifer Kay Woofter, the best way to improve military-media relations and 
to create better understanding among these two camps working in a peacekeeping domain 
is to organize a permanent training structure, which will engage the military and the 
media in joint preparation exercises.97 Indeed, in order to make military-media 
communication better, some initiatives concerning mutual learning must be organized. 
Joint exercises will surely increase the level of mutual respect and understanding, 
diminishing the negative influence on working relationships caused by different cultures.  
It’s really kind of naïve for the military to expect the press to behave 
themselves when the military doesn’t really work with the press when it 
trains. It’s naïve of the press to think that they can suddenly dispatch a 
bunch of reporters to a military operation who don’t know which end of 
the tank the bullet comes out of.98 
Thus, it would be right to come back to the question of joint training, discussed by 
Rodriguez in “Embedding Success into the Military-Media Relationship.” Rodriguez also 
supports the idea of improving military-media relations by mutual training. As an 
example, he examines the preparation training that was organized by the Pentagon for 
both the military and the press before deployment in Iraq in 2003. In order to familiarize 
journalists with the conditions present in the field, the military offered them special 
training. A significant number of journalists took part in such field exercises called 
“Embed Boot Camps” which were conducted at Ft. Benning, Ft. Dix, Quantico Marine 
Corps Base and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia. The courses lasted a week and 
included such activities as nuclear, biological and chemical training.99 The training was 
not mandatory, nevertheless many journalists participated. The main idea of such an  
 
 
                                                 
97 Woofer, 121. 
98 Quoted in Woofer. 
99 Rodriguez, 5. 
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enterprise was to break barriers between the press and the military. One of the journalists 
described the event as, “alternately enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and physically 
exhausting,”100 
Embedding arrangements developed by the U.S military seem to be revolutionary 
and very successful. Because, during such “Embed Boot Camps,” not only reporters but 
also soldiers have the opportunity to get closer to their field “partners,” this experience is 
mutually rewarding. 
[“Embed Boot Camps”] allowed the reporters and military to build trust in 
each other and to get familiar with each other’s terminology and routines. 
It also allowed the news organizations and reporters the opportunity to test 
their new equipment, techniques, and procedures for reporting in what 
would be a fluid, hectic environment.101 
While the media plays a crucial role in the contemporary peace operations, it 
would be a very good solution if such trainings become more popular, not only in the 
United States, but also in Europe, especially among those countries that actively 
participate in international peacekeeping efforts. CIMIC units may also serve here as 
links between the two different “worlds” and play the role of leaders while dealing with 
these ideas. Taking into consideration the role that CIMIC plays in the peacekeeping 
field, decision makers should realize that improving media-military communications will 
surely be mutually gratifying. 
The role of the local population in the peacekeeping process is obviously very 
important. The goals of the mission cannot be achieved without prior understanding and 
significant support of the local communities for the whole peace effort. Thus, this is the 
challenging task for the international community, politicians and for the peacekeeping 
force to find good channels of communication with locals. As Marjan Malesic in Peace 
Support Operations, Mass Media, and the Public in Former Yugoslavia argues, “it is 
obvious that the way to the population is through the mass media”.102 Moreover, as 
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Malesic explains, it is crucial for the military to realize some relevant facts about the 
media. First, while it operates strictly on the ground and the probability of media 
encounters is very high, the military should be accordingly prepare for such encounters. 
Second, the role of the military should also be to know the attitude of the media toward 
the peacekeeping force. Finally, the military must be aware of the great influence of the 
media on local and international audiences, requiring peacekeepers to treat the media 
with the utmost respect and seriousness. Keeping the local communities well informed 
about peacekeeping activities conducted in the region can be achieved by establishing a 
fruitful cooperation between peacekeeping force and the media; this should be organized 
on the basis of CIMIC-media communication. 
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IV. CIMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY 
PEACEKEEPING 
Cultural issues in peacekeeping missions are important for CIMIC personnel in 
the same way as the matters related to the media. This chapter will explain why an 
increased cultural awareness and specific pre-deployment training for CIMIC officers 
should be highly encouraged. CIMIC activities usually take place outside of military 
compounds, where many of the military’s typical behaviors do not apply. CIMIC staff, as 
it was in the case of the media, are especially vulnerable to cultural issues in peace 
operations, because it is the role of CIMIC units to cooperate and coexist with various 
IOs, NGOs, local authorities, tribal leaders, contractors and individuals. All these 
organizations and actors represent different cultures, not only in an organizational sphere, 
but also considering religions, nations, tribes or customs. The importance of culture for 
CIMIC personnel will be underlined in this section. For better understanding of the need 
for increased cultural awareness among soldiers, and to show what kind of cultural issues 
CIMIC staff typically meets in the field, some authentic stories will be presented. By 
building a broader image of CIMIC activities in the field, the real-life examples will lead 
to the right conclusions concerning appropriate cultural preparation for the mission.  
A. CULTURE 
It will be very helpful to start with a short theoretical discussion concerning the 
term “culture.” Such basic exploration of the meaning of “culture” will contribute to the 
better understanding of this section; also, it will assist in associating cultural issues with 
practical implementations of “culture” in the field. Kevin Avruch in Culture and Conflict 
Resolution broadly develops the meaning of “culture.” First, he proposes a rather 
ambiguous definition: “that culture is a derivative of individual experience, something 
learned or created by individuals themselves or passed on to them socially by 
contemporaries or ancestors.”103 Then, Avruch explains, that the presented definition 
suggests that the term of “culture” is more changeable that previously expected and 
proposed by social sciences. What is important, as Avruch asserts, is that not only the 
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influence of the ancestors, “tribes, ethnic group, and nation,” matters when we discuss the 
meaning of “culture.” When we try to develop a fully appropriate definition of “culture,” 
we have to consider the fact that it also derives from “profession, occupation, class, 
religion, or region.” This way, Avruch suggests, the presented definition explains that 
“individuals embody multiple cultures, and that culture is always psychologically and 
socially distributed in the group.”104 As it was presented, “culture” is not easy to define. 
While it may constitute a set of inherited experiences and deeply rooted habits, “culture” 
can also be represented by the contemporary and altering sets of experiences transmitted 
within such groupings as professions or classes. What is also important, as a result of the 
complexity of cross-organizational and interpersonal globalized reality, is that individuals 
can embody multiple cultures.  
B. PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT – “CULTURAL PUZZLE” 
Today’s peacekeeping missions provide intercultural challenges for 
peacekeepers. Because the U.N. forces come from different countries and 
are working in a non-familiar environment, culture shock and cultural 
misunderstandings are inevitable. Communication is a constant challenge 
in any intercultural endeavor…105 
The end of the Cold War brought enormous changes in the conduct of peace 
support operations (PSOs). Today, international interventions encompass a wide variety 
of actors, actively participating in bringing relief to those in need. Traditional 
peacekeeping has been transformed into very complicated and multi-task enterprise that 
includes humanitarian actions, electoral efforts, human rights issues, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. The multicultural composition of military forces and diverse nature of 
IOs, NGOs and local communities, demands a well coordinated effort and better 
preparation of both civilian and military actors allowing a wider “repertoire of skills.”106 
Indeed, as Duffey argues, many problems of the contemporary peacekeeping 
relate to culture. Things like coordination problems between civilian and military 
organizations, communication difficulties or even problematic and unclear mandates, are                                                  
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all strictly connected with the cultural sphere of PSOs. This wider range of activities 
brought many unexpected problems which can surely be associated with culture. Those 
who plan and conduct peace operations, as well as all host country actors, constitute a 
piece of the bigger cultural framework. Additionally, Duffey explains, culture has a great 
impact on the peacekeeping environment, and, when the participants lack cultural 
awareness and understanding, it can severely impede achieving mission’s objectives.107  
Because culture really matters in peacekeeping, there should be constant analysis 
performed by policy makers in order to decrease the harmful influence of culture, thus 
increasing the effectiveness of the whole peacekeeping effort. 
To fully understand the role of culture in peacekeeping, Duffey argues, it is 
necessary to first recognize the main cultural communities which take part in the 
peacekeeping effort. As she explains, the most important cultural relationships exist 
internally, between the peacekeeping force which consists of many different nationalities, 
including various civilian organizations and civilian individuals incorporated in the 
mission structures; and externally, between the military and the numerous IOs, NGOs, 
local communities and individuals. Thus, it is underlined that given the organizational 
diversity among actors in the field, each of these organizations tries to “play the game” 
according to its own rules. The rules vary depending on understanding of the situation, 
practices, norms and policies which have been developed based on previous experience. 
Cultural gaps between all actors in the peacekeeping environment also exist, because 
each player created its own cultural way of thinking and doing things – a set of norms – 
which help to propagate its philosophy and achieve its objectives.108 Moreover, as 
Duffey asserts, by careful analysis of the cultural environment that is characteristic of a 
particular mission, there should be a “culturally sensitive approach” developed, which, 
she argues, will be “more likely to support sustainable peace processes.”109  
To avoid problems and misconduct connected with the lack of cultural sensitivity 
in previous peacekeeping missions (see i.e. O’Neill and Rees, 2005), the international 
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community and all actors which actively participate in peace support operations must 
consider lessons learned and incorporate cultural aspects during preparation for current 
and future peace operations. “Solid, thorough preparation for dealing with an unfamiliar 
culture can often mean the difference between success and failure in peacekeeping 
missions.”110 It is significant to be aware of the cultural differences, and it is crucial to 
see the ways in which misunderstandings related to the lack of cultural preparation for the 
mission can seriously hamper peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, because all players in 
the field have various skills, expectations, capabilities and experiences,111 we must 
develop a mission strategy which will identify shared goals, allowing them to achieve 
their objectives through mutual support and fruitful cooperation.  
Except cultural differences and clashes between numerous organizations such as 
IOs, NGOs and individuals acting in the peacekeeping field, there are obviously internal 
conflicts between peacekeepers who usually come from many various nationalities. 
Charles C. Moskos Jr. in Peace Soldiers argues that military culture really matters. By 
analyzing the composition and behavior (the author provides authentic statistical data and 
soldier’s statements) of soldiers in United Nations Mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the 
author explains what kind of conflicts were apparent among nationalities, what role the 
country of origin played in soldier’s behaviors, and in which ways the internal cultural 
mélange influenced the effectiveness of the whole peace operation.112  
Considering the year in which the book has been written, it must be concluded 
that the aspects of culture influencing peacekeeping did not develop with the end of the 
Cold War. Cultural matters existed since the time when various organizations and 
soldiers from different nationalities started to participate in multinational peace support  
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operations. But, as Moskos points out, because many authors examined the organizational 
side of peace operations, his intention was to come down from the strategic level and 
analyze particular relationships between individuals involved in peacekeeping.  
The main task for Moskos was to determine, using “military sociology” 
divagations, whether the “traditional notions of soldierly honor”113 can be adapted to the 
roles demanded by peace operations. Also, he wanted to find out how the international 
nature of peacekeeping forces influences soldier’s obedience and how difficult it is to 
transform soldiers with different backgrounds to the roles they have to play in PSOs. 
Moskos defines many kinds of internal conflicts which appeared among UNFICYP 
forces on various levels: conflict between UNFICYP and the UN, between UNFICYP 
and home military establishments, between UNFICYP HQs and national contingents, 
between national contingents within UNFICYP, between various components within the 
same nationalities and between military personnel and civilian staff of UNICYP.114 His 
findings lead to the conclusion that it is really a great challenge to create a supportive 
environment for the multinational nature of peacekeeping forces to work effectively in 
the field. 
Robert Getso in “Preparing Warriors to Be Peacekeepers” represents a very 
interesting approach to the issue of preparation of soldiers for peace support 
operations.115 He argues that because of the huge gap between the nature of wars and 
peacekeeping operations, the transformation of “warriors” into “peace soldiers” proves to 
be very challenging. While both “warriors” and peacekeepers share common military 
knowledge and similar backgrounds, their training for the mission and especially conduct 
of field tasks vary significantly. Thus, Getso underlines cultural differences between 
these two kinds of military professions, and suggests much better specialist pre-
deployment training for soldiers taking part in PSOs. 
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Employing the military in peacekeeping or non-combat operations entails 
a cross-cultural shift at the individual level. This movement is 
characterized as a psychological shift – from the military culture of the 
war fighter to the civil-military culture of the peacekeeper – with social, 
behavioral, psychological, and philosophical implications.116 
Getso concludes with some recommendations considering special pre-deployment 
training for peacekeepers. The peacekeeping environment depends on peacekeepers' 
special adaptable features which help them to understand the intricate cultural “puzzle” of 
PSOs. Additional training will guarantee better co-existence and cooperation between 
actors in the field, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the peacekeeping force. An 
increased cultural awareness among “peace soldiers” will ultimately affect their cultural 
adaptation skills and encourage them to operate more actively and without constrains in 
the field. Pre-deployment training should be conducted in such a way that will assist the 
future peacekeepers in overcoming various cultural challenges they will meet in the 
peacekeeping environment. More details about aspects related to training for 
peacekeepers will be presented in the last section of this thesis. 
…success in such operations [PSOs] will be determined by the degree to 
which all of the players can step outside of their individual cultures and 
value systems… surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the best, 
rather than the worst, in those with whom they must solve the problems 
they will confront.117 
Efrat Elron and colleagues presented a very wide and, surprisingly, very positive 
picture of cross-culture interactions among peacekeeping forces.118 The authors also 
identified three main sources of misunderstandings and conflicts between peacekeepers 
connected with language and culture, transmission of orders and difficulties with trust 
among nations. Although they mention how destructive and disturbing cultural 
differences during peace support operations can be, they are primarily focused on the  
numerous advantages which can be produced by cultural diversities in peacekeeping. 
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Generally, the authors argue that at the individual soldier’s level, there are many self-
regulating mechanisms which help to overcome cultural barriers among nationalities.  
As mentioned above, while Elron and colleagues admit that “differences in 
partner nationality and culture often lead to conflicts and misunderstandings that can limit 
the sharing of information and learning, which are crucial to the effectiveness of 
organizations,”119 they say that such diversities can be fruitful in producing positive 
outcomes within organizations. The authors explain that these positive outcomes can be 
achieved because increased levels of creativity, decision making and the enhanced range 
of cognitive reserves are all effects of the blend of cultures within the structure of the  
peacekeeping force. In addition, the authors suggest that individual skills, which are 
developed through experience, constitute an element which will contribute to the 
enhancing of coordination and cooperation between different actors in the peacekeeping 
field. The most desirable individual skill described by the authors is “intercultural 
competence” which, as they explain, is “the ability to relate effectively and appropriately 
in various cultural contexts.”120 In detail, the set of skills must include features which 
should not only let the individual understand and see what is happening around, but also 
to react appropriately in every situation he/she can meet.  
Elron, et al. describe in their chapter the most important and influential 
mechanisms which help in keeping the multinational and multicultural peacekeeping 
force together. Another objective for them was to suggest the most desirable individual 
skills which help in improving cross-cultural relationships, thus enhancing the 
effectiveness of the whole peace effort. “Cultural flexibility” and “military 
cosmopolitanism,” the two terms which can certainly be applied for the expected set of 
skills for CIMIC personnel, will be presented in the next paragraphs.  
C. CULTURAL ISSUES AND CIMIC 
Because of the nature of contemporary peace support operations and, as a result of 
demands created by the kinds of tasks which are usually conducted by CIMIC personnel, 
it is very important for CIMIC staff to possess a significant range of various skills which 
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are necessary. General peacekeeping knowledge, staff and field experience, political and 
cultural sensitivity, and spoken and written communication skills are the features which 
should be the most desirable. Besides these skills, CIMIC personnel must be equipped in 
basic legal, logistical, public administration and engineering knowledge. Moreover, in 
connection with a multitude of various organizations present in the field, CIMIC should 
be great coordinators and facilitators of international efforts. Apart from this, there is also 
a great importance in individual skills such as interpersonal communication and 
openness, which enhance and enable them to conduct everyday tasks in the field.121  
Culture awareness still remains one of the most relevant skills for CIMIC 
personnel. Because it is CIMIC's task to cooperate with different IOs and NGOs, CIMIC 
staff cannot escape from meeting new cultures in the field. Local authorities and 
individuals, with whom CIMIC officers have to deal very often, also represent different 
cultures, which can be overcome only by an increased level of cultural sensitivity among 
CIMIC staff. Durable and persistent peace transformation in the region highly depends on 
the level of local communities’ understanding of the peacekeeping effort, thus demanding 
much better cultural preparedness of CIMIC personnel. The better understanding of PSOs 
by the belligerents that can be achieved, the greater chance there will be for peacekeeping 
forces to reach the mission’s objectives. This can be only accomplished by fruitful and 
mutual communication between peacekeepers and local actors. So, this is the great 
challenge for those CIMIC staff who encounter different cultures, especially when they 
have to understand various culture-based assumptions and act based on reliable data and 
expertise. Thus, there is a great need for learning about local habits, and, by keeping in 
touch with local people, learning about lives and values that are characteristic in the 
region.122 
It will be very useful to present now the two key individual skills which seem to 
be particularly relevant for the job conducted by CIMIC officers in the peacekeeping 
environment. “Cultural flexibility” or “self-monitoring” and “military cosmopolitanism,” 
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as mentioned above, have been developed and suggested as very important for 
peacekeepers by Elron, et al. in “Cooperation and Coordination across Cultures in the 
Peacekeeping Forces: Individual and Organizational Integrating Mechanisms.”  
Cosmopolitanism – is first of all a mindset that indicates an orientation 
toward the outside world, a willingness to engage with those who come 
from different cultures. It entails an openness toward divergent cultural 
experiences.123 
What is also relevant to the cosmopolitan behavior of peacekeepers is connected 
with personal abilities and competency, which improve cross-cultural communication 
through “listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting.”124 Moreover, “cosmopolitanism” 
among peacekeepers should also guarantee that an individual will have the capability to 
see the particular situation from different points of view, acknowledging and accepting at 
the same time the differences that exist between people who come from different 
cultures. Such an approach will lead the individual to the accurate assessments of  
outcomes of cultural “clashes” that occurred in the past, happen currently and will happen 
in the future.   
Elron, et al. also underline the importance of “cultural flexibility” or “self-
monitoring,” “which is the tendency to regulate one’s own behavior to meet the demands 
of social situations.”125 As they propose, the level of self-monitoring significantly rises in 
a culturally diverse environment. When individuals possess an appropriate point of 
cultural knowledge about the people they interact with, there is a much greater possibility 
that they will use it to adapt to the situation, thus increasing the probability of successful 
and fruitful communication. As a quoted Irish officer says: “It’s not they who have to 
change, it is you who have to change. And you have to be different for every single 
person.”126 Thus, being flexible and possessing a suitable level of adaptation can be very 
crucial for peacekeepers, especially for CIMIC personnel who actively participate in 
various enterprises in the peacekeeping environment.  
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D. CROSS-CULTURE COMMUNICATION – CIMIC APPLICATION  
Marc Ascui, CIMIC Course Director at the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Center in his “Culture Awareness”127 module, broadly examined 
the influence and importance of cultural issues for CIMIC personnel. He noticed the 
crucial role of culture in conflict resolution, and suggested that without necessary cultural 
awareness preparation, CIMIC staff will always encounter difficulties and 
misunderstanding while conducting their activities in the peacekeeping field. Generally, 
as Ascui argues, “communication is a vehicle for the CIMIC Officer to overcome”128 
challenges connected with cultural barriers existing between the military and civilian 
components of international relief organizations. Indeed, studying and learning different 
cultures and getting familiar with foreign languages, can play an essential role in the 
conduct of CIMIC activities, contributing to the increased effectiveness of peacekeepers 
and the whole peacekeeping effort.  
Similarly to the proposition of Tamara Duffey in “Cultural Issues in 
Contemporary Peacekeeping” presented earlier, Ascui also suggests dividing the cultural 
knowledge, which is essential for understanding of its role, into three dimensions existing 
in contemporary peacekeeping. From his point of view, the reality of current international 
interventions demands that communications be treated from a culturally relevant 
perspective on three levels:129 
• communications among various parts of the peacekeeping force, which 
usually come from different countries; 
• communication between the military and civilian organizations like IOs 
and NGOs, which always participate actively in bringing humanitarian 
relief to those in need; and  
• relationships between the military and civilian actors comprising the 
peacekeeping force and various civilians such as local authorities, tribal 
leaders, companies or individuals.  
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Ascui also reminds us, in the same way as Duffey, that if we want to fully 
appreciate the role of culture in peace support operations, two approaches must be made 
– an internal and external. First, internal communications exist between cultural “military 
puzzle” and civilian actors comprising peacekeeping forces. Second, externally, there are 
interactions between all peacekeeping personnel, both military and civilian, and the 
locals. Only by being aware that cultural interactions in PSOs take place between internal 
and external communities, will it be possible to identify the sources of misunderstandings 
and build the bridges which allow fruitful communication and enhance the effectiveness 
of the peacekeeping effort.   
The reality of contemporary peacekeeping, as Ascui asserts, brought significant 
changes not only considering the ways in which missions are organized and conducted, 
but also considering the repertoire of skills needed for managing the coordination 
between numerous actors in the field. Moreover, besides many problems connected with 
ambiguous mandates, logistics, planning and control, “the international peace operations 
community has failed to consider the importance of culture.”130 Thus, for better 
understanding of the two communities, the civilian and military, Ascui developed a chart 
that determines main organizational culture differences that contribute to various 
misunderstandings and conflicts between these two “different worlds.”131 
                                                 












The military is a conservative, 
hierarchical organization. 
Aid workers tend to be liberal – in terms 
of appearance, attitude towards 
authority, etc. 
Soldiers are legally bound to follow the 
direction of superiors (when lawful 
orders are given). 
Leaders are often younger, and have 
more authority devolved to them than 
military counterparts at similar levels. 
Decision-making authority is often 
retained at high-levels and needs to pass 
through several chains of command. 
Civilian agencies and NGOs have a 
longer-term approach; they are often 
present before the military deploy, and 
will still be around after the military has 
withdrawn. 
As the military is a last resort, and a 
very costly option, it is often deployed 
as late as possible and withdrawn at the 
earliest opportunity. 
Actions are based on experience and 
lessons learned rather than on SOPs and 
doctrine. 
 Within an organization, sub-offices are 
not necessarily responsible to offices of 
the same organization in the capital. 
Some may have specialized functions 
and different reporting lines. 
 Civilian agencies tend to coordinate 
amongst themselves through a 
consensus-seeking model rather than a 
command model. 
 
Table 2.   Ascui’s chart comparing organizational cultural differences between military 




E. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION’S ENVIRONMENT – ESSENTIAL 
CULTURAL INDICATIONS FOR CIMIC PERSONNEL 
Not only politicians and those who plan peacekeeping missions, but also civilian 
organizations and the forces that carry it out all comprise the peacekeeping environment. 
There are also various local actors such as local authorities, companies, tribal leaders and 
individuals who constitute an important background, a field on which aforementioned 
players act. Only by finding proper communication channels between the force and local 
population can the expected mission’s objectives be achieved. Following Ascui’s “Hints 
to Develop Cultural Awareness,”132 the next paragraph will discuss basic behavioral 
skills that might be helpful in “breaking” the cultural walls by peacekeepers: 
• It is important to approach every new situation with an “open mind.” In 
other words, transferring experiences from one country to another does not 
ever guarantee a success; our memory and various prejudices should not 
affect contemporary activities. 
• Arriving at the place, we have to be aware of the historical background of 
conflict in the area. Knowing the political and historical situation 
significantly increases the probability of better understanding and fruitful 
conduct of the assigned mission. 
• While working in the field, we should be interested in everything new that 
surrounds us. By showing interest in local people’s behavior, culture and 
habits, we systematically increase our knowledge what can result in 
enhanced perceptional abilities and increased job effectiveness. Moreover, 
by respectfully asking questions about the local environment, the military 
proves its interest in the country, thus strengthening its credibility and trust 
among local communities.  
• When we face problems, we should not hesitate to ask questions of our 
companions. It is always better to share our doubts with someone else; 
also, it might be very helpful to hear someone else’s opinion.  
• While participating in various conversations, it is crucial to make sure that 
we understand things properly. Again, by asking questions we make things 
clear and show a real interest in the issue.  
• It is also important to pay special attention to our stereotypes. While 
acting in the international environment and cooperating with different 
nationalities and diverse cultures, we should treat our partners and the way 
they conduct their work respectfully. Indeed, if we show our respect 
towards someone else once, we will be treated with respect in return.  
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• It is highly recommended to learn basic common words of the locally used 
language. Such a small effort can significantly increase our job’s 
effectiveness in the field. By saying even the simplest words in 
somebody’s home language we can break the wall, build trust and gain 
sympathy. Knowing foreign language we clearly demonstrate our respect 
and care for the country and its citizens; also, under some circumstances, 
basic foreign language knowledge can facilitate conflict resolution. An 
example concerning CIMIC officers’ preparation training for the KFOR 
mission in Kosovo presented by Wentz in “Civil-Military Operations” 
greatly reflects and confirms this: 
The language training included participation in a five-week language 
training course in either Albanian or Serbian. The language training 
included some instruction on basic aspects of the social culture in which 
the soldiers would find themselves. Some soldiers with Hispanic 
background actually picked up Albanian quite quickly once in country. 
Once onsite, the fact that soldiers were trying to learn basic language skills 
had positive effects of helping to break the inner barriers of the local 
Albanian and Serbian cultures.133 
F. REAL-LIFE CIMIC FIELD CULTURAL EXPERIENCES  
Cultural awareness may bring many advantages to peacekeeping forces. Increased 
cultural awareness among peacekeepers, especially among CIMIC personnel, can 
produce advanced interest in the mission, encouraging them to engaging in various 
peacebuilding activities in the local societies, which normally, without cultural 
preparation, would be very impaired. What is also very important, peacekeepers who are 
more population-oriented and significantly accustomed to the local society, may 
constitute a very successful preventative body, particularly against terrorists or insurgents 
acting in the area. Better knowledge of the locals can drastically restrain the actions of 
those with anti-peace motivations. Appropriately culturally sensitive peacekeepers can 
become caring “neighbors who want their adopted societies to prosper. They will create 
social conditions that encourage and enable the belligerents to undertake peacemaking 
and peacebuilding activities that avoid violence.”134 Moreover, CIMIC staff should 
constitute the bridging body which will successfully close the gap between the military, 
civilian relief organizations, and local civil institutions which are being rebuilt. 
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Effectively acting CIMIC personnel can significantly contribute to the systematic 
decrease in the number of coalition forces acting in the field, with no negative impact on 
the whole peacekeeping effort. Thus, the spectacular activities conducted by well 
prepared CIMIC staff can even contribute to the shortening of presence of peacekeeping 
forces in that area.135 So, to increase the understanding of the huge role that CIMIC plays 
in contemporary peacekeeping, it will be very helpful to provide some short real-life 
stories related to CIMIC field experiences taken from Kosovo and Iraq. 
Larry Wentz in “Civil-Military Operations” described in detail the actions of 
CIMIC and CA tactical support teams (TSTs) which operated in the area as part of KFOR 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo. As a great example of the effectiveness of CIMIC/CA 
activities he presents how CIMIC/CA, by conducting its job, changes attitudes toward 
peacekeeping forces. Mainly because of the great involvement of CIMIC/CA TSTs in 
small quick impact projects in the local area, Serbian lack of trust and cooperation 
significantly changed within a year. As Wentz underlines, “the local population attitude 
changed substantially, especially in the Serbian communities.”136 
Another bright example, this time more specific, also taken from Wentz’s paper, 
talks about problems connected with potatoes. When the local Serbian farmers were 
experiencing great problems with selling about 200 tons of potatoes picked the previous 
fall, they contacted the CIMIC TST acting in this area. CIMIC immediately managed to 
contact the local agricultural supply coordinator in Vitina who arranged the sale of over 
40 tons of potatoes to Albanian community. What is the most important aspect of this 
story – is that it was the first time Albanians bought Serbian products in such large 
amounts.137 Albanians did not care who planted the potatoes, they bought them because 
they needed them. The story also illustrates how it is sometimes simple to achieve 
consensus between belligerents when there is a well operating CIMIC unit in the area.  
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In Iraq, spring 2006,138 the official visit of one of the CIMIC TSTs at the house of 
the local tribal leader followed routinely – it started with some nice words in the local 
language and the host asked his guests to drink tea with him. One of the Polish CIMIC 
team members, in trying to be polite, praised the tea-kettle that the tribal leader was 
using. The host then offered it to him. The CIMIC officer was not prepared for such an 
offer and gently refused. The next day, the tribal leader came to the camp gate and 
brought the kettle with him – still insisting to give it to the officer. When the CIMIC unit 
member refused again, explaining that although it was very nice but it was also too 
precious, the man completely change his attitude. Since that day, the relationships 
between them significantly deteriorated, which also had an impact on the rest of the team 
because the tribal leader was an important element of the CIMIC-local society 
communication net. In fact, the kettle was not expensive, but because it would cause 
many transportation problems for the CIMIC officer, he decided not to take the gift. As 
he was informed later, under such circumstances, in the local culture, it is highly 
recommended to take the present. Small gifts and favors from both sides mean little in 
and of themselves, but they can become priceless and very fruitful during future 
relationships.  
The last situation shows how it is sometimes important to sit, drink and talk with 
the locals first, and then proceed to business. CIMIC tactical support teams were visiting 
various places such as local authority’s offices, tribal leader’s houses, police stations, 
courts and prisons, etc. every day. During one of the visits at the refugee camp in the 
vicinity of Al-Kut, the TST members were invited to the camp leader’s tent to discuss 
their basic needs. Having in mind earlier experiences of being offered tea or other cold 
drinks, only one team member decided to drink the water straight from the bucket 
standing in the tent. As appeared very soon, the camp’s leader talked only to the team 
officer who joined him drinking water from the bucket. In conclusion, sometimes it is 
                                                 
138 The next two stories were described by CIMIC officers from the CIMIC Group Center in Kielce, 
Poland. The factual information has been sent via e-mail. The CIMIC unit has been actively participating in 
numerous quick impact projects in the South-Central part of the country since summer 2003. The efforts of 
CIMIC units, especially CIMIC TSTs acting in the field proved to be very important in building trust in 
stabilization forces among local populations, also, playing the leading role in communication between the 
local authorities, tribal leaders and society from one side, and the military from the other.  
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worth acting against everything that we have been told during the preparation training; 
from time to time, in order to achieve a basic level of trust, certain rules have to be 
broken.   
Cultural awareness knowledge is fundamental to CIMIC personnel acting in the 
peacekeeping environment. Fruitful and smooth cooperation are less likely without 
knowing how international and local organizations operate and what the main protocols 
and cultural practices within those communities are. Although culture itself does not 
guarantee a peacekeeping success, it is of great importance to keep the level of cultural 
awareness on the appropriate level, especially among CIMIC personnel who actively 
participate in various activities taking place among numerous elements of the “cultural 
puzzle” outside of the military installations.139 Because culture proves to play an 
important role in the contemporary peacekeeping operations, and because the 
international community largely fails to recognize this fact, it will be crucial in the 
foreseeable future to consider lessons learned and create training which will prepare 
peacekeepers properly.  
Communication skills, especially negotiation and the use of interpreters by 
CIMIC officers will be presented in the next sections. Because specific communication 
skills which are important for CIMIC personnel in the field are, as it was in the case of 
culture, particularly apparent during tactical level activities, divagations about negotiation 
and interpreters’ issues will also be underlined by using real-life examples taken from 
operations in Kosovo and Iraq. 
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V. NEGOTIATION – AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR CIMIC 
A. NEGOTIATION SKILLS FOR CIMIC PERSONNEL 
The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense is central to the 
concept of United Nations peacekeeping... any problem between UN 
peacekeepers and [parties directly concerned] can be resolved peacefully 
by negotiating and persuasion, and therefore the use of force becomes 
unnecessary and counterproductive.140 
Considering the conditions under which CIMIC personnel conducts their tasks in 
contemporary peacekeeping missions, it must be admitted that communication is much 
more challenging than it is under standard circumstances. In a strange environment, under 
often stressful situations, CIMIC officers have to deal with various organizations and 
individuals who belong to different cultural backgrounds daily. Such conditions, contrary 
to the duties conducted in home countries or during peaceful times, demand special 
communication and negotiation skills preparation for CIMIC staff.141 This section will 
briefly develop the idea of negotiation and how it can affect the effectiveness of activities 
performed on a daily basis by CIMIC personnel in the peacekeeping environment. In 
addition, there will be some fundamental negotiation guidelines provided which should 
give the audience a basic understanding of negotiation, and maybe, encourage them to do 
some additional research on negotiation. In the last paragraphs of this section, similarly to 
the sections devoted to culture and work with interpreters, there will be several real-life 
stories presented. The real-life examples taken from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan 
should both support the proposition that situations which demand negotiation skills on 
CIMIC/CA personnel are very common, and increase the level of understanding about 
the importance of negotiation skills training for CIMIC/CA officers. Overall, the purpose 
of this section is to explain how important it is to understand the value of negotiation and 
its unlimited possibilities for practical implementations by CIMIC/CA officers acting in 
the multicultural peacekeeping environment. 
                                                 
140 Getso. 
141 Cedric de Coning, “Negotiation Skills” in Cedric de Coning (ed.), CIMIC in UN & African Peace 
Operations, ACMC Programme, ACCORD March 2006, available at: 
http://www.accord.org.za/cimic/manual.htm (last visited on 16 December 2006), 231. 
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B. NEGOTIATION – THE DEFINITION OF GIVE AND TAKE 
Indeed, the statement that “negotiating today is one of the least understood arts in 
human affairs”142 seems to be very realistic. Despite the fact that these words were 
written years ago, they are just as relevant today. As a result of the demands of modern 
international reality, we have negotiation courses of study offered and many great books 
have been written to help learn negotiating and influencing skills. However, to approach 
the negotiation process and to understand it completely requires getting involved in real 
negotiations. Everyone negotiates every day, usually without any awareness. To improve 
negotiating skills, basic negotiation strategies have to be known, then they have to be 
verified and put into action in ongoing practice in the field. But what exactly are 
negotiations? 
One of the many definitions of “negotiation” was developed by Brad McRae in 
Negotiating and Influencing Skills. The author suggests that “negotiating is taking place 
any time two people are communicating, where one or both parties have a goal in 
mind.”143 Very similar opinions are shared by Roger Fisher, Bruce Patton and William 
Ury, the authors of Getting to Yes: 
Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from 
others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach 
an agreement when you and the other side have some interests 
that are shared and others that are opposed.144  
As it was shown, both sources point out that there are at least two basic factors for 
negotiating to exist, first, there must two sides with a “goal in mind,” second, the sides 
have to communicate. Thus, looking at these definitions, even for a person who is not an 
expert in a field of semantics, it is obvious why the negotiation process is so difficult to 
understand. Communication skills which are always bounded by cultural differences and 
disparities in goals may always cause conflicts. Learning about cultures, understanding 
new specific training demands and applying completely innovative skills can be very 
challenging for the new generations of peacekeepers.                                                  
142 G. Nierenberg Fundamentals of Negotiating (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973), XI. 
143 Brad McRae Negotiating and Influencing Skills (SAGE Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
1998), V.  
144 Roger Fisher, William Ury, Bruce Patton Getting to Yes (Houghton Miffin Company, NY, 1991), 
XVII. 
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Although every negotiation is different because of the diversity of goals and types 
of communication skills implemented in action, the basic element remains the same. 
Learning and applying negotiation skills is surely a very difficult and time-consuming 
process, but a well prepared and experienced negotiator can effectively face every tense 
conflict situation which would be especially helpful for CIMIC personnel. An individual 
who is adequately prepared and experienced in communications and negotiations is just 
as valuable to the military as a perfectly equipped, trained and experienced individual in 
combat.  
C. IMPORTANT NEGOTIATION SKILLS FOR PEACEKEEPERS 
Contemporary peacekeeping operations take place in diverse environments. Many 
civilian actors such as local authorities, International Organizations, Non-Governmental 
Organizations or even the individuals (local elites' leaders or local contractors) influence 
the array of actions performed by the military forces. Described conditions have arguably 
changed the basis of contemporary peacekeeping, and underlined the importance of 
CIMIC units.145  
W. Hansen, O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhause, the authors of Hawks and 
Doves: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution point out that, since the end of the Cold 
War, peacekeeping has undergone substantial changes. They underline “the significance 
of conflict research and theory building for peacekeeping practice.”146 The authors 
determine the importance of “specific skills and the training necessary for contemporary 
peacekeeping missions, focusing especially on the contribution to conflict resolution.”147 
According to their opinions, the new features introduced by contemporary peacekeepers  
 
 
                                                 
145 Stuart Gordon “Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC),” The 
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, posted 13 July 2001, available at: www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm (last 
visited on 15 December 2006). 
146 Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse Hawks and Doves: Peacekeeping and 
Conflict Resolution, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (August 2004). 
Available at: http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/uploads/download/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf#search=%22hawks%20and%20doves%20peac
ekeeping%20and%20conflict%20resolution%20hansen%22 (last visited on 15 December 2006), 2. 
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should be, for example, techniques of promoting good communication, negotiation and 
mediation. These “consent-promoting techniques constitute the soft skills,”148 and are not 
the usual skills exercised by soldiers. 
So, considering current peacekeeping missions’ demands, and having now a much 
better understanding of the spectrum of CIMIC activities, it must be underlined that a 
more broad and innovative communication and negotiation training for peacekeepers 
should be encouraged. Also, because of the nature of the tasks performed by CIMIC 
personnel in the peacekeeping environment locally, this special training should be 
provided not only for soldiers from upper levels of command, but especially for those 
acting at the tactical level. 
Deborah Goodwin in Negotiation in International Conflict broadly developed the 
idea of negotiation in peacekeeping and clearly underlined the crucial role negotiation 
plays in contemporary peacekeeping, especially on the lowest, tactical level of 
operations. “Recent deployments have shown the greater emphasis towards conciliation 
and consent in ‘operations other than war.’ The importance of diplomacy in negotiation at 
every level of command is an essential tool...”149 The truth is that armed forces around 
the world seem to review and rebuild training programs so as to educate modern soldiers 
in the critical business relating to people and communication skills. “The act of 
persuading people that it is better to live peacefully than to survive in the state of war, 
that it is more effective to work together towards a common good than to kill each other, 
is only really effective at the grassroots level, which is where our soldiers operate.”150 
Indeed, only by putting greater emphasis on activities within the local communities and 
by creating an increased socio-political awareness among local people, the peacekeeping 
forces can achieve the mission’s objectives and set the groundwork for an enduring peace 
in the region.  
                                                 
148 Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 9. 
149 Deborah Goodwin Negotiation in International Conflict (Portland, Frank Cass, OR 2002), XIII, the 
words of MAJ. GEN. A.G. Denaro CBE. 
150 Goodwin, XIII. 
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The increasing importance of negotiation as a dispute-resolution technique has 
been clearly stated in Deborah Goodwin’s book. She also points out that “to date there 
has been little investigation of the nature of tactical level negotiation and the way in 
which this duty is impacting upon the responsibilities of the serving soldier.”151 And, 
again, the vision of a universally trained soldier-negotiator seems to be very hard to 
achieve. The diversity of conflicts existing around the world and multiplicity of parties 
involved in a conflict, cause negotiation to be very difficult, and make negotiation 
different at various levels of command. 
Cultural context within which those negotiations are taking place is of a great 
importance. Often the meaning of negotiation is totally different among countries with 
different cultures. It is crucial in cross-cultural communication, as Coning explains, to 
pay a special attention to the matters related to culture and, primarily, to respect different 
cultures under every circumstance. “If you are professional, humble, friendly and 
respectful, your chances of not offending anybody are very good.”152 Ignorance of the 
cultural differences may cause further clashes not only between belligerents but also 
between peacekeeping forces and host parties.  
In the reality of contemporary international interventions, soldiers, especially 
CIMIC/CA officers who actively fulfill their tasks outside the military compounds, must 
accept the new rules of engagement and adapt new essential communication and 
negotiation skills. “Modern mandates often require the protagonist to use negotiation as a 
first resort and armed force as the last.”153 Looking back at the history of UN 
interventions, peacekeeping politics sometimes fails. As Duffey argues, today’s 
peacekeeping strategies should be built on more culturally-based considerations. 
Contemporary international peacekeeping efforts must constitute more balanced 
approaches where both top-down and bottom-up policies would be implemented. 
“Current peacekeeping policy is culturally insensitive, focusing predominantly at the top 
level of diplomatic negotiations and the prescription of ‘quick-fix’ Western processes and 
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institutions.”154 Explaining that complicated phenomenon of international intervention in 
a culturally different environment and focusing particularly on the lowest level of 
operation could be very interesting and deserves wider investigation and explanation. 
D. BASIC GUIDELINES ABOUT NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
CIMIC officers act on a daily basis as a link between peacekeeping forces and the 
civilian environment. Because encountering people who represent various organizations 
and communities is often connected with both informal conversations and formal 
negotiations (sometimes organized as formal meetings), having at least basic knowledge 
about negotiating techniques constitutes an essential toolbox for CIMIC personnel.155 
Unfortunately, as Goodwin suggests, soldiers are not usually trained to conduct such 
activities as negotiation or mediation, because it does not fit into the normal range of 
skills expected of them. Because of the nature of the traditional soldier’s training and 
war-related tasks, and because in today’s peacekeeping missions the spectrum of skills 
expected for soldiers has dramatically increased, military negotiators’ performance is 
limited and impaired.156 Compared to the professional civilian negotiators who have  
appropriate bargaining training, military micro-negotiators157 suffer from a lack of 
proper skills and are forced to acquire their practical skills by, very often, painful field 
experiences. Moreover, conditions under which peacekeepers operate are completely 
different and more disturbing to the course of negotiations, which can produce even 
greater damage for an unprepared and inexperienced military micro-negotiator.  
Soldiers are professional combatants, not professional negotiators, who are 
placed in a chaotic and dangerous working environment. Within this 
environment they must ply their trade, diverse as it is, with only a brief 
pre-operational negotiating training, if they are lucky.158 
Additionally, as Goodwin explains, the negotiating activities conducted at the 
lowest, tactical level by junior level CA officers, together with their outcomes, may have 
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a significant impact not only on the negotiating counterparts, but also on other 
peacekeepers, and, even more relevant, on higher levels of operations. The nature of CA 
activities requires additional capabilities which let the soldiers on the ground act at higher 
levels of competence than they are usually expected. Indeed, decisions and actions taken 
on the tactical levels of operations, surely affect the environment above and beyond.159  
To understand the importance of negotiations and improve individual’s problem 
solving skills it is necessary to know the basics and roots of conflict. The next section 
discusses the causes of conflict and suggests various approaches for how the conflict can 
be explored and resolved.   
E. CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
Bernard Mayer in The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution argues that in order to 
understand the need for conflict resolution, negotiation or mediation, we should first 
examine the roots of conflict. He suggests that at the center of all conflict are human 
needs. People fight because they either have some goals which can be achieved in the 
course of conflict or because their needs are incompatible with the needs of others.160 
Mayer also explains that there are five basic forces which constitute the main sources of 
conflict among people: “communication, emotions, values, the structures within which 
interactions take place, and history.”161 It will be very helpful to discuss shortly how 
these factors can ignite conflicts. 
Emotions: Emotions, as Mayer asserts, are the fuel for conflicts. Because it is in 
peoples’ nature to let emotions lead their actions, conflicts arise very often. Emotions can 
be produced by either current events or negotiation process, or by previous experiences or 
prejudices. What is most important, emotions do not let people focus on seeking an easy 
and peaceful way to meet their needs, but force them to focus on their counterparts’ 
strong and violent positions which very often lead to the escalation of the conflict. Under 
circumstances where emotions play a leading role and both parties’ abilities to seek a 
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successful solution are significantly impaired, it is very important to look for the third 
party intervention. This is why the role of contemporary peacekeepers is very important. 
Values: Conflicts based on values, Mayer explains, are especially difficult to 
resolve. This is because values constitute the set of beliefs about “what is important, what 
distinguishes right from wrong and good from evil, and what principles should govern 
how we lead our lives.”162 Values comprise peoples’ identities, which lie very deep in 
their nature. When people feel that their values are under attack, it often means for them 
that they are under attack. Though values often play an important role in a conflict’s 
arising they can also prevent further escalation. This can be achieved by seeking common 
values by both parties; this approach can lead to more collaborative solutions and finally 
to the stable resolution of the conflict. 
Structure: Structure is the environment, the frame in which communication takes 
place. Resources, various procedures, time limitations, communication procedures, even 
material settings can constitute the elements of a structure. In certain situations, even if 
both parties may represent a constructive and collaborative approach to conflict 
resolution, the elements of structure are so restraining that they lead to the escalation of 
this conflict.  
History: Dealing with conflicts we have to consider their history and previous 
interactions between conflicting parties. History can have a great influence on the course 
of each conflict because, as it was in the case of emotions, it can act as fuel for conflict 
escalation. As Mayer suggests, it is impossible to fully understand the conflict without 
knowing its historical roots.163 
Communication: Mayer explains that people are very imperfect in 
communication. Conflicts arise very often even when there are no significant 
disagreements between parties but when there are problems with smooth communication. 
Factors such as culture, gender, age, class or environment, can all have an enormous 
influence on the individual’s effective communicative skills. Moreover, when parties try 
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to communicate under difficult conditions, or they try to send their messages under 
emotionally hard circumstances, the effective communication is usually considerably 
impaired.  
Generally, communication skills are the most important in the area of conflict 
resolution. Fortunately, Mayer says, “communication skills can be learned, applied, and 
enhanced.”164 In addition, there is nothing more important in communication than the 
intentions of both parties in the conflict. Commitment, even while opposing parties meet 
many difficulties and make various mistakes in the course of communication, can 
contribute to the successful and constant conflict resolution. 
F. LISTENING 
The skill of listening, concentrating on what is being said, as well as what 
is not being said, can prove to be enormously helpful in negotiation.165 
Listening is very important for good communication to exist. It is crucial that 
every negotiator develop listening skills – the basis for good communication. Especially 
in a peacekeeping environment, within a complicated cultural mélange, when there is a 
particular need for showing interest in what is being said, careful listening can contribute 
to fruitful and quick reconciliation. By being a good listener, an experienced negotiator 
learns many things about counterparts; the history of the conflict; and others’ positions, 
attitudes, strategies and expectations. In addition, he clearly demonstrates his respect and 
openness, which can significantly improve the atmosphere in which negotiations take 
place, creating a supportive groundwork for finding solutions.  
Mayer also develops so called listening to connect and listening to debate.166 The 
first kind of listening may serve as a great tool in seeking common ground between 
negotiating parties, whereas the other kind usually leads to more competitive approaches 
pursued by the conflicting sides. Listening to connect seems to be more appropriate and 
relevant for the purposes of peacekeeping because it leads to the solutions achieved 
through common understanding. This approach presumes that both sides to a conflict try 
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to comprehend the positions and interests of the others, seeking the solutions that will 
allow them to achieve some goals jointly. Such an approach highly promotes mutual 
understanding and sets the basis for peaceful reconciliation.  
G. SEPARATE PEOPLE FROM THE PROBLEM 
The basic approach is to deal with the people as human beings and with 
the problem on its merits.167 
Fisher, et al., in Getting to Yes proposed several relevant approaches which should 
constitute a set of basic guidelines for every negotiator. One of the initial propositions of 
the authors is the separation of people taking part in disputes from the problem which 
always accompanies the case. The first, very important fact which is necessary for 
understanding this approach is to be aware that the people who are involved in 
negotiation are only human – meaning that they will be guided by their emotions, various 
values, diverse backgrounds and viewpoints, which often make them unpredictable. Thus, 
it is highly recommended to pay enough attention – to be more sensitive towards other 
people’s problems. If we fail to understand and introduce this human approach, it would 
become very harmful to the whole negotiation process.168 As soon as we manage to 
separate people’s feelings from the matter of negotiation, it will become clear how to 
work out the solution which would be satisfying for both parties. Because sometimes 
only human perceptions block the agreement, when we decide to move them aside or 
understand another’s position, it may become apparent that both parties share the same 
goal.  
Communication plays a crucial role in this approach. A good negotiator has to 
learn various listening skills and paraphrasing techniques and be prepared to ask 
questions. The more we listen and the more we speak about ourselves, the greater is the 
chance for achieving an agreement. It is also important to have the abilities of “speaking 
to be understood” and “speaking about yourself, not about them.”169 In order to improve 
relations in the course of negotiations we have to try to create an atmosphere which will  
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help the parties feel like they are talking to a friend to work out an agreement in a joined 
effort. That kind of behavior will improve the negotiation atmosphere and help to clearly 
define how the others see the problem.  
H. FOCUS ON INTERESTS NOT POSITIONS 
You can hardly expect the other side to listen to your interests 
and discuss the options you suggest if you don’t take their 
interests into account and show yourself to be open to their 
suggestions.170 
This approach suggested in Getting to Yes belongs to the key rules which are 
commonly applied in the course of negotiations. To explain the meaning of “interests” 
and “positions” Fisher, et al. use a simple example, a story about two men quarreling 
about the window at the library. They were bargaining how to leave it open. Finally, the 
librarian helped to solve the problem by asking each of them why they want to have the 
window closed or open. After discovering that one party needs some fresh air and another 
wants to avoid a draft, the librarian opened the window in the next room solving the 
problem very easily.171 
Thus, it becomes clear what “interests” and “positions” are: the former are the 
main motivators for people, they are major issues hidden behind people’s choices and 
behaviors; the latter are something that we have decided upon, things which are 
consequences of our interests. So, the point of this approach is to have the ability to look 
at people’s interests not positions where possible. Such a technique will help to reveal the 
real issues behind human behavior, facilitating the finding of satisfying solutions and 
achieving agreements.  
I. BATNA 
The idea of BATNA which is the “Best Alternative To a Negotiated 
Agreement”172 also belongs to the key set of abilities that can have an essential influence 
on negotiation. In detail, BATNA is the second best alternative, another possibility in 
case the first negotiation fails. Fisher, et al. asserts that one of the most important actions 
taken before negotiations is a determination of our own and the other’s BATNA. Why is 
                                                 
170 Fisher, et al., 55. 
171 Ibid., 40. 
172 Ibid., 97. 
 74
BATNA so crucial? The answer seems to be straightforward. Having our BATNA 
developed, while we are sitting at the negotiating table and discussing possible solutions, 
we keep an additional “ace up our sleeve.” What is equally important, when we know our 
negotiation partner’s BATNA as well, it gives us a pretty good picture about what is 
happening around the negotiating table.  
The more you can learn of their alternatives, the better prepared you are 
for negotiation. Knowing their alternatives, you can realistically estimate 
what you can expect from the negotiation.173 
The best possible situation is when our BATNA is much stronger than the 
BATNA of our counterpart. Such circumstances let us remain relaxed in the course of 
negotiation, and give us much greater control over a negotiated issue. As the authors of 
Getting to Yes explain, “the better your BATNA, the greater your power.”174 Indeed, it is 
in our best interest, as it is suggested in the case of having a much stronger BATNA than 
our negotiating partners, to show our BATNA to the others. Such an approach can 
significantly soften our counterparts. On the contrary, under the circumstances when our 
BATNA is much weaker than the other side can expect, it is highly recommended not to 
reveal it.   
J. PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATION 
Coning differentiated several main circumstances under which CIMIC officers 
can face negotiation situations in the field, these include:175 
• negotiating freedom of movement; 
• various discussions about the roles and relationships between the military 
and belligerents or local authorities; 
• resolving disputes; and  
• discussions or negotiations which take place during official meetings. 
Each of these situations can be described as tactical level negotiations and needs a 
different approach. However, according to Coning, there are some guiding principles 
which determine a successful negotiation:176  
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• Proper understanding of a mandate and the whole peacekeeping effort 
(military interest); 
• Preparation of strategies; 
• Careful and detailed knowledge about other parties; 
• Thinking beyond and predicting future steps of the others; and  
• Full understanding of the historical/cultural background. 
As it was shown, the aforementioned factors, which contribute to the success in 
negotiation, mainly refer to the preparation phase of a factual negotiating process. Indeed, 
preparation is essential to effective negotiations. The higher the level of your preparation, 
the greater are your chances of achieving consensus. “Do your homework” – this is how 
Gerard I. Nierenberg starts his discussion of the negotiation preparation phase,177 
underlining the importance of solid preparation for every negotiation. Doing homework, 
Nierenberg asserts, should be composed of several relevant steps: knowledge about me, 
knowledge about the past, detailed knowledge about counterparts, and careful planning of 
strategies. Although the author suggests that all these factors are important, he clearly 
puts more emphasis on gathering information about our counterparts in negotiation. “You 
should be prepared with every possible kind of information about the people with whom 
you are going to negotiate.”178 Thus, even while gathering essential information about 
our partners in negotiations can be very difficult considering the nature of peacekeeping 
operations, getting familiar with only basic information can prove to be very helpful in 
the course of bargaining. Unfortunately, what has to be admitted is that many of the 
micro-level military negotiators have to negotiate ad hoc, without any preparation. This 
fact makes the work of military negotiators very difficult. In such situations, Coning 
explains, the individual’s negotiating skills and basic knowledge of the history of the 
conflict, cultural background, as well as soldier’s field experience can prove to be very 
helpful and make facing unexpected negotiations less challenging.179   
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Not only knowledge about me is important, understanding our counterparts' 
interests in negotiations is equally crucial. Focusing on our partners can help us better 
understand their positions, which can result in smoother negotiations. Sometimes, it can 
be very supportive when we try to be in our “counterpart’s shoes,” or if we think about 
what motivates them; such techniques provide us with an additional knowledge about the 
others, helping to shape our negotiating approaches.180 It is much better to sit at the 
negotiation table well prepared. The awareness of having done the homework can 
significantly increase a negotiator’s abilities to act effectively. It is also important to react 
quickly to a changing situation in the course of negotiations. It happens very often in 
bargaining, that our previously chosen negotiating strategy needs to be changed. 
“Therefore it is important to be constantly on the alert for new developments.”181 
K. IMPROMPTU SITUATIONS 
The following situation happened in 2004 in central Iraq where the Polish CIMIC 
Tactical Support Teams (TSTs) were operating.  
The main task of my TST was to support the local Iraqi Police Forces and 
all the prisons and detention centers in our JOA. Our job was to conduct 
some basic restoration works and provide various supplies for the police 
stations, prisons and detention centers in the area. According to the rule – 
“when it is possible, do not do it using military assets, let them do it” we 
were arranging all the restoration works and supplying tasks with close 
cooperation with local Iraqi contractors recommended either by the 
authorities of the province or by our predecessors. We had an unexpected 
visit in our camp one day. Two police stations’ chiefs together with the 
contractor that was supplying their precincts came to us to quarrel about 
the equipment they were receiving. One of them did not like the TV set’s 
brand that the contractor provided him; he argued that the other police 
station got a much better one. Anyway, first, for us (CIMIC guys) it was a 
complete shock – How, for God’s sake, can they ask for the better TV, 
while they are getting everything for free??? (In our culture such behavior 
would be very, very unusual). But, we understood that probably in this 
case this is not only the question of a brand but a matter of prestige, a case 
of which police station is more important. So, because the exchange of the 
TV sets was impossible, we decided to solve the problem in a different 
way. The guy who was dissatisfied with his TV got a sofa kit of a much 
                                                 
180 Technique proposed by Chester L. Kerrass in Give and Take, HarperCollins, New York 1993, 2, 
120; see also Fisher, et al., 23. 
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better quality than his companion from the other police station, and it 
worked! They all walked away very happy. (TV sets and large and 
comfortable sofa kits constitute an ordinary equipment of every precinct in 
Iraq)182 
Considering the nature of CIMIC activities, we must realize that CIMIC personnel 
will not have the opportunity to conduct solid preparations for negotiation every time. 
There are many unexpected situations which demand special and sensitive approaches; 
situations that demand the application of various techniques used in negotiations. Such 
circumstances require at least basic theoretical knowledge of negotiation. Also, using 
common sense and field experience can be very profitable. 
In this case, rather than focus on “this seems crazy” the CIMIC tried to 
understand the interests of the parties in conflict and what was contributing to the 
conflict.  By identifying prestige and equity as concerns, the CIMIC officer was able to 
negotiate a solution. 
Another story includes basically similar problems. But, this time the issue was 
solved in a different way: 
When we (CIMIC TST) wanted to negotiate with the managers of the 
local medical clinic about the equipment they wanted, only the beginning 
of the meeting was nice. After a while, they wanted more and more, not 
understanding that we had our priorities and limitations as well. As we 
began to see that the agreement might be threatened and that the people 
were difficult to talk to, we decided to ask our and their superiors to make 
a deal. So, we arranged a meeting between our brigade commander and a 
local Iraqi Governor. The brigade commander explained for us what we 
wanted and what exactly could be delivered for the clinic. The Iraqi 
Governor informed the clinic managers without discussing with them, and 
the case was over.183 
As exemplified, there are situations that are really difficult to resolve even when 
they look very simple. The aforementioned story suggests that is it sometimes better to 
withdraw from a difficult dispute and to try to engage people with greater influence. In 
                                                 
182 The story was described by CIMIC officer from CIMIC Group Center in Kielce, Poland. 
Translated from Polish. An e-mail message to author, October 2006. 
183 Although the source remains the same, this situation took place in 2006 in Wasit Province. 
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this circumstance, considering the nature of the military involvement in the case, it was 
relatively easy to ask higher authorities for assistance and to reach agreement.  
The following story took place in Afghanistan. This is how a CA Team Leader 
described his negotiating experiences with local people: 
In the spring of 2004, I was deployed to Afghanistan as a Civil Affairs 
Team Leader. I was working with a tribe in the Pashtun area. One night, 
the unit that I was supporting heard of some Taliban in one of local 
villages. They sent out a combat patrol and began a search of the village, 
house by house. As an American entered a house, he saw a man reach for 
a rifle and point it at him, so the American fired, believing he was about to 
be shot. The Afghan did not know who was entering his house was only 
trying to protect his family. Hence, this was an accidental killing. It was 
my job to talk with the family of the slain Afghan and his tribal elders to 
“fix” the situation. This particular tribe had been very sympathetic to our 
presence in Afghanistan (all of the local workers on our base were from 
this tribe) and this incident strained relations. I had to convince the locals 
that this was a mistake and to negotiate for their continued support. I met 
with the family and local village elders. I worked with the base leadership, 
from a different unit than the one I was supporting, and was able to secure 
jobs for the deceased man’s brother and cousin, thereby providing income 
for the deceased’s family.184 
This story has several important aspects like respecting Rules of Engagement 
(ROE), an individual soldier’s cultural awareness preparation, communication and 
language skills preparation, and finally CA involvement. For the purpose of this section, 
only the last will be touched upon.  
As shown, when the accidental death of a villager significantly deteriorated 
previously good relations between the local community and the military, commanders 
decided to send the Civil Affairs Team to explain the unfortunate event to the tribal 
elders and the family of the deceased man. Indeed, no one knows better than Civil Affairs 
personnel working among the local population every day about the local tribal 
relationships, behaviors, habits and way of living. Thus, only CA staff can become 
locally operating negotiators and conflict resolution facilitators.  
                                                 
184 The information came from a CA team leader via an e-mail message to author, November 2006. 
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The next CIMIC field experience took place in Kosovo and was described by 
Larry Wentz in “Civil-Military Operations.” The events were connected with violent riots 
in Kamenica: about 3,000 Albanians unhappy with a situation in the local area started 
throwing rocks at Russian forces. This is how Wentz described the reaction of the local 
TST: 
TST members supporting [the Quick Reaction Forces] team intervened 
and were able to calm the situation by negotiating with Albanian leaders 
they knew. Getting to know the villages, their residents, and particularly 
the leaders, cannot be underestimated. TST members were quite effective 
in building local trust relationships and legitimizing the commitment of 
KFOR.185 
Wentz describes, in detail, the involvement of TSTs and its role in KFOR’s 
peacekeeping efforts. By giving examples of successful negotiations performed by 
CIMIC personnel in urgent situations, he underlines the crucial role that CIMIC can play 
in the area in which it operates. CIMIC acts in the civilian environment on a daily basis. 
The task of CIMIC staff is to meet, discuss and help local communities in many ways, 
thus creating a positive image of the peacekeeping force and setting the groundwork for 
conflict resolution and constant peace in the region. What is equally important, because 
CIMIC officers usually know the most influential individuals in local communities, they 
can prove very helpful in resolving unexpected displays of animosities in the area. Quick 
and effective local conflict resolution may become one of the main tasks for CIMIC 
personnel. CIMIC knowledge about the local environment and its ability to negotiate 
cannot be undervalued. Thus, CIMIC personnel must, with no doubt, be equipped with at 
least basic negotiation knowledge and practice.  
The presented real-life stories connected with everyday CIMIC/CA field 
experiences exemplified and underlined the following points: 
• How important it is for peacekeeping forces to maintain a high 
involvement of CIMIC units in locally based activities; 
• How beneficial CIMIC knowledge about local environment can be, when 
we consider its practical implementations in locally performed 
negotiations and conflict resolution; and 
                                                 
185 Larry Wentz, “Civil-Military Operations” available at: 
http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last visited on 15 December 2006), 499. 
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• Knowledge about conflict resolution and negotiation including practical 
skills must obviously belong to the necessary “toolbox” of CIMIC/CA 
personnel. 
L. WORKING WITH INTERPRETERS 
Cultural interpreters help peacekeepers become knowledgeable and well 
prepared to take part in the customs and activities of the country they are 
working in by improving experience and confidence in dealing with their 
counterparts and in respecting and observing their main customs and 
practices.186  
1. Interpreters – CIMIC Application 
Because the case of interpreters covers both culture and negotiation in 
peacekeeping, there is a separate section in this thesis which is particularly devoted to the 
role of interpreters in the peacekeeping setting, especially in CIMIC activities. The nature 
of contemporary United Nations’ interventions concerning their multicultural and 
multilingual environment, causes major communication problems internally, between the 
elements of peacekeeping forces, and externally, between the elements comprising the 
whole UN community working in the field and the local population. According to its 
function, CIMIC’s main task is to provide fruitful communication between the military 
and local communities, communication, which would play a dual role: to support the 
main task of the mission’s commander and to the support local community. CIMIC 
personnel can fulfill their goals only when it is possible to communicate with the local 
society, which normally speaks a different language. Thus, it is crucial for CIMIC staff to 
understand the importance of interpreters, and know the basic rules of how to use them in 
the most efficient way. This section will briefly describe some details of interpreters’ 
work, present practical guidelines for the realistic use of interpreters, and, by showing 
several field examples, illustrate how important and challenging the cooperation with 
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2. Local Interpreters – Advantages and Disadvantages 
It is common practice to employ local people as language assistants to work with 
CIMIC officers in the field,187 which can be both fruitful and damaging for the 
communication processes. The following paragraphs will discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of such cooperation. 
a. Advantages of Cooperation with Local Language Assistants 
No one knows the local environment better than the locally hired 
interpreters. Local language assistants know the composition of the local society, the 
history of existing conflicts within local communities, habits, tribes, influential 
individuals, etc. Moreover, as Edwards explains, because of the high stress hampering 
second language skills among peacekeepers, which is characteristic of peace operations, 
and under particularly sensitive conflicting circumstances, it is very important to reduce 
the likelihood of interpretive misunderstandings by hiring local interpreters.188 Local 
language assistants act as cultural liaisons between the two parties. Only an individual 
from the local community can fully recognize the sensitivity of the local environment and 
help to solve problems which would be impossible for an outside interpreter or the 
military alone to solve. Thus, the best way to fully understand the local environment and 
to minimize the amount of misunderstandings during CIMIC activities is to employ a 
local language assistant.  
Employing locals increases trust, improves cooperation and enhances the 
whole picture of activities conducted by peacekeepers in the eyes of local people. In war 
torn countries, where the unemployment rate is usually very high, such actions contribute 
to major improvements of the living standards of the locals. Even if such jobs are only 
temporary, they significantly improve cooperation between the peacekeeping forces and 
the local communities. Providing jobs and showing the belligerents the right way to live 
peacefully can constitute a very good beginning for the creation of an enduring peace and 
reconciliation in the country. 
                                                 
187 Cedric de Coning, “Working with Interpreters” in Cedric de Coning (ed.), CIMIC in UN & African 
Peace Operations, ACMC Programme, ACCORD March 2006, available at: 
http://www.accord.org.za/cimic/manual.htm (last visited on 16 December 2006). 
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While there can be a wide variety of local languages, the local language 
assistant will know the right one. Various nationalities, communities and tribes which 
often live in the same area, commonly use different languages. The best way to get the 
message through properly is to cooperate with local language assistants.  
Local language assistants are usually well educated people who may have 
a great influence in the local community; considering their education, they are also 
usually much respected people in the local environment.189 Thus, creating fruitful 
cooperation with the local language assistants can contribute to the positive news and 
opinion transmission about various CIMIC activities conducted in the area, and about the 
whole peacekeeping effort in the country.  
In spite of the vast differences in the skills of translators and interpreters, 
there is one thing that they must share, besides deep knowledge of both 
languages: they must understand the subject matter of the text or speech 
they are translating. Translation is not a matter of substituting words in 
one language for words in another. It is a matter of understanding the 
thought expressed in one language and then explaining it using the 
resources of another language.190 
b. Disadvantages of Cooperation with Local Language Assistants 
The main problem with locally hired language assistants is the lack of 
professional preparation. This does not mean that they lack language skills or are not 
willing to work; it is mainly connected with the lack of practical training and field 
experience which can significantly impair the effectiveness of their performance. Larry 
Wentz in “Peace Support Operations: Cooperation, Coordination, and Information 
Sharing: Lessons from Kosovo” noticed the existing problems related with 
communication and with locally hired interpreters. He points out that in Kosovo, “locally 
employed interpreters sometimes explained rather than translated, or added their own 
spin, and required careful monitoring.”191 Indeed, local interpreters are usually difficult 
to control; they often forget about translation, make their job a usual chat with the others 
                                                 
189 Coning, 247. 
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Lessons from Kosovo” available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/publications/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf (last 
visited on 15 December 2006), 693. 
 83
completely forgetting about their tasks and taking over the conversation. Such behavior 
requires more patience and strict monitoring of their work which results with losing focus 
on the meeting’s objectives.  
This is how a CIMIC officer from the Polish TST describes the 
cooperation with the local interpreter in Iraq, Babil Province:  
The use of an interpreter is an art. Trust your interpreter and control your 
interpreter. Locals were very useful interpreters because of their 
knowledge of the culture and tradition, but they tend to take over the 
conversation. I had to balance between politeness and effectiveness in 
using the interpreters. Moreover, counterparts not used to working with 
interpreters, tend to make their statements very long, which were lost in 
translation. In the beginning, I always asked for short sentences (which 
was rude) and forced my interpreter to interpret before the counterpart 
finished (even more rude), because otherwise I would have lost most of 
the conversation.192 
Wentz also suggests some practical solutions that were implemented in 
Kosovo, when the military had problems with the local language assistants. He asserts 
that in some circumstances it can be very useful to use another language which is known 
by both parties, even if both sides know just the basis of that language. What happened in 
Kosovo was that some officers had been using German or Italian when they were 
speaking to the locals. While they spoke only a little German and Italian, the whole 
practice helped to establish more direct relationships with locals, thus improving the 
whole communication process.193 
Not surprisingly, the Polish CIMIC personnel in Iraq reacted similarly to 
the problems with local interpreters. Tactical support teams had to deal with locally hired 
contractors who provided various supplies and conducted numerous quick impact 
projects in the local environment. The role of the interpreters became very important. So 
when, in some cases, the use of local language assistants appeared to be more 
problematic, CIMIC officers started speaking English, which was possible because, 
                                                 
192 Information obtained from a Polish CIMIC officer who participated in two rotations in the 
stabilization mission in Iraq (2003 and 2005)and had a great field experience in working with local 
community. The message sent via e-mail, September 2006.  
193 Wentz, 693. 
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fortunately, most of the local engineers had been well educated and knew basic English. 
Moreover, as in the case of Kosovo, direct communication led to more close relationships 
between the military and local community, and had a very positive impact on the 
smoothness of CIMIC activities conducted in the region.194 
Societies in war-torn regions are often especially divided. Seeing a 
language assistant from one belligerent group assisting the military may produce feelings 
of mistrust or even hostility among the others. This issue is particularly difficult when we 
consider the nature of ethnic conflicts. Very often, because of deeply rooted animosities 
and various biases within different groups of the local society, finding and using an 
impartial language assistant can become very problematic. As Wentz noticed, it is often 
the role of the military to convince the locals that the main objective of the mission and 
all its components (including locally hired interpreters), is to bring stability and an 
enduring peace to the region regardless of ethnicity. Such explanation, Wentz says, was 
especially difficult in the areas where the use of an Albanian interpreter provoked 
hostilities.195 
3Finding a neutral language assistant is also difficult; it is normal that an 
employee from one tribe will favor his comrades. Thus, one of the three major features of 
the local language assistant, according to Edwards, along with language “proficiency” 
and “competency”, is “unbiased attitude.”196 Indeed, biased interpreters can significantly 
influence the communication process. While an impartial, local interpreter can contribute 
to the improved effectiveness of military activities, his biased attitude can severely 
damage civil-military relations, and even deteriorate the interior relations between local 
communities.  
3. The Use of Interpreters by CIMIC Personnel – Practical Hints 
The intelligence, personality, and street smarts of an interpreter can be 
crucial in helping you convey your point across linguistic and cultural 
barriers. The interpreter is your local specialist in public relations. An  
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interpreter can give you suggestions on the best way to proceed with a 
person from a different cultural background, and may notice nuances that 
would otherwise be overlooked.197 
Cedric de Coning in “Working with Interpreters,” underlined the importance of 
the role of interpreters in CIMIC activities, and introduced several main guidelines that 
can be helpful in facilitating work with interpreters in the field. According to Coning, an 
appropriate cooperation with an interpreter should consider: 
• We should respectful of the country, people, and religion, and never show 
disrespect toward these things in front of our local language assistant. It is 
important to appreciate the role of interpreters as “ambassadors” of the 
local communities and to have in mind, that those individuals, because of 
their education, are especially respected among locals. In addition, it is 
advised not to look at the interpreter during the conversation, but to make 
eye contact with our counterparts. This way, we show respect, 
understanding and a great interest in what is being said.  
• Because local language assistants do not have professional training, it is 
useful to brief them before the actual job starts; basic explanations about 
how he should behave and what will be the main message of the meeting 
are very helpful for every interpreter.198 The interpreter should also be 
told where to stand or sit during his job. Moreover, the local language 
assistant must know that he should not provide an evaluation of what is 
being said, but an interpretation of the factual message. Although, where 
required, the interpreter should provide cultural context in addition to the 
translation, he must be instructed not to make evaluations, assumptions or 
analyses. 
• As a result of the lack of training for the interpreters, CIMIC officers must 
be aware of common misunderstandings in culturally sensitive 
environments. So, as Coning suggests, it might be very helpful to broadly 
use paraphrasing and repeat the messages. Such a policy can assure both 
sides that the discussed issue was properly understood. Thus, it is also 
important to reserve more time than was previously planned for meetings, 
mediations or negotiations.199   
• Every language is very specific. There are numerous cultural “undertones” 
or complicated idioms which can be easily misinterpreted. So, to make the 
interpreter’s job easier and more accurate and effective, it is suggested to 
use short sentences; also, avoiding idioms, jargon or technical language. 
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• In addition, although humor is usually helpful and practiced, it does not 
always break the cultural boundaries very easily. Using humor in 
communication we must be aware that what is very entertaining for us can 
produce even offensive reactions among the others. 
• Coning also points out the role of body language in communication. 
Working with the interpreters or without, we have to be aware that we 
transmit messages even when we are not speaking. The same gestures 
often have different meanings in different cultures, often causing 
misunderstandings. However, as Coning suggests, “a smile will never be 
misunderstood,” and “a polite handshake between people from the same 
sex will be accepted in most cultures.”200  
Indeed, working with interpreters is an art, truly. There may be many other 
guidelines presented about how to make the interpreter’s job more effective and easier. 
For CIMIC personnel, it is very important to understand the role that interpreters play in 
the contemporary peacekeeping environment. Even without professional training, local 
language assistants can be very well equipped and appropriately briefed by CIMIC staff 
before every meeting, mediation, negotiation or simple conversation. Briefing and field 
experiences can significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of an interpreter’s 
work. Moreover, CIMIC personnel must understand that a locally hired interpreter, as a 
specialist in local relations and cultural background, can constitute a crucial element in 
communication between the military and the local communities in peacekeeping 
operations.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IMPROVING COORDINATION AND COOPERATION 
In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what 
you did… now we can’t live without you.  
Admiral Leighton Smith, 
Commander, IFOR, April 1996201 
 
Much has been done in the field of civil-military relationships in peacekeeping 
since the early 1990s when, as pointed out in “Civil-Military Cooperation, Lessons 
Learned and Models for the Future,”202 because of a common lack of trust and reluctance 
to cooperate, many things went wrong. Nowadays, as a result of worldwide acceptance 
and understanding, CIMIC constitutes an integral and necessary part of every 
peacekeeping force. However, while international organizations and individual 
governments accepted the vital role of CIMIC and provided additional education and 
training for CIMIC personnel, there is still much to be done to achieve the maximum 
effectiveness of CIMIC units and to improve coordination and cooperation in the field – 
the necessary conditions for accomplishing the mission’s objectives.  
As it was suggested by General Christian Hvidt during the opening of the CIMIC 
conference in Copenhagen, it is not only the military who should be blamed for the lack 
of cooperation and coordination in peacekeeping operations. He explained that the other 
side of “the CIMIC equation – the civilian side”203 is also responsible for problems with 
synchronization of their efforts. This was mainly the result of huge differences in 
organizational directives, lack in coordinating the objectives and diversity in operational 
procedures. And, what is the impact of such a situation in the peacekeeping field? Hvidt 
argues that meeting various International Organizations and Non-Governmental 
                                                 
201 Colonel William R. Philips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation, SHAPE, “Civil-Military 
Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia,” NATO Review Online (Vol. 46-No. 1 Spring 
1998), available at: http://www.shape.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/9801-en.pdf (last visited on 6 January 
2007), 24. 
202 Jakobsen (ed.), “Civil-Military Co-operation, Lessons Learned and Models for the Future,” Danish 
Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen, 2000, 5. 
203 Ibid., 6-7. 
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Organizations in the JOA is not a new phenomenon for the military. What really causes 
confusion and limits the effectiveness of the military efforts is the complexity of the 
whole peacekeeping environment, which significantly influences the ways in which the 
military fulfills its tasks. This is the role of Civil-Military Cooperation; this is the place 
where the peacekeeping force has to rely completely on CIMIC support to provide 
fruitful interactions between the civilian and military worlds.  
Besides the need for increased cooperation among civilian organizations acting in 
the field, as Hvidt proposes, education and training requirements for both the military and 
civilians are also encouraged. Improved knowledge of the peacekeeping environment 
among peacekeepers and civilians together with joint exercises will significantly increase 
mutual cultural awareness, thus contributing to major improvements in fulfilling real 
tasks in the field.  
1. Joint Planning, Training and Liaison Officers 
Education and training are essential to producing unity of effort in the 
field. Personnel exchanges, joint courses, and combined planning can 
occur without compromising the integrity of either the military or 
humanitarian missions.204 
Coordination and cooperation between the military and civilians in peace support 
operations are still a significant barrier. “It is still difficult engaging with the staff of 
international organizations and NGOs…This is a two way problem.”205 Integrated 
training for civilians and military personnel constitutes another crucial element which 
could significantly increase the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation. During the 
Paris Conference on “Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding” on 2 June 2006, it was 
noticed that “NATO military planning does not systematically integrate external non-
military actors, as there is currently no doctrinal basis for broadening actor participation 
in the planning process.”206 Apparently not much has been done during the last four years 
since the NATO CIMIC doctrine AJP-9 was approved. The AJP-9 clearly explains that to 
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“understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of IOs and NGOs it is necessary to 
maintain relationships with them prior to entering an area of operations, and to educate 
them through military schools and courses which incorporate integrated training.”207 
Indeed, including civilians in military mission preparation training, and conversely, 
inviting the military to participate in humanitarian mission arrangements could 
enormously improve civil-military cooperation and its ultimate effectiveness during the 
mission.  
Dr. Michael C. Pugh also notices problems with communication and effective 
cooperation not only between the military and civilians but also among civilian 
organizations themselves.208 He suggests that the main obstacle responsible for the 
impaired coordination in the peacekeeping environment is the complete fragmentation of 
organizations, tasks and perceptions existing in the civilian domain of operations. 
Permanent exchange of information, as he proposes, can be one of the main factors 
contributing to increased cooperation in the field. CIMIC centers, where the 
representatives of numerous actors meet, can serve as a great opportunity for such 
information exchange. Moreover, Pugh underlines, liaison officers should constitute an 
additional factor which would strengthen cooperation and decrease the influence of 
cultural differences between organizations. Liaison arrangements should take place 
between the military components and lead civilian organizations, but, just as crucial, 
various civilian agencies must also dispatch their liaison personnel among each other. 
B. EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR CIMIC PERSONNEL 
Considering the nature and importance of CIMIC activities conducted in the 
contemporary peace support operations, an appropriate level of individual’s preparation 
must be underlined. CIMIC personnel often face unpredictable situations.  It is not 
always possible to quickly find solutions. Adequate knowledge about the environment, an 
appropriate level of cultural awareness and individual sensitivity will usually help one in 
approaching problems in the correct way. “Thus, the effectiveness of the military team on 
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the ground ultimately comes down to the quality of the participants.”209 Indeed, specific 
tasks performed by CIMIC officers demand the engagement of soldiers with additional 
abilities. So, countries which contribute their CIMIC soldiers to various peacekeeping 
operations should provide them with sufficient knowledge and practical training.210 
Achieving fruitful communication between the military, civilian agencies and host 
country actors is not possible without appropriate culture awareness and training for 
CIMIC staff. Unfortunately, as Last suggests, the lack of a unified effort and mutual 
understanding of capacities between the military and humanitarian communities causes 
peacekeeping missions to be very ineffective.211 While military contingents can reach 
local communities very easily, they lack crucial peacebuilding skills, especially those 
including communication, culture, language and relationship building. Peacekeepers 
receive very little training considering local culture. Most of the information they get 
comes from talks with others peacekeepers, books, and newspapers; the official cultural 
preparation training is usually very limited.212 On the other hand, civilian organizations, 
which are usually present in the area for a longer time, have these cultural and language 
resources but lack the assets to allow them reach the local communities, because of 
security, for example.  
Close cooperation and fruitful exchange of information between the military and 
civilian agencies which operate in the JOA can positively influence the outcomes of the 
whole peacekeeping effort. Defining military and civilian priorities, finding common 
goals and introducing mutual support during various field tasks when needed will be a 
good way to make the civil-military relationship better. The Australian contingent, for 
example, before deployment in Somalia, not discussing the overall effects of the mission, 
took advantage of the knowledge of a relief organization that had been acting there 
earlier. The military consulted with the NGO CARE in order to get some additional, 
practical insights concerning the area in which they were to be deployed.213 
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1. Cultural Awareness 
CIMIC officers acting in the field are responsible for maintaining good 
relationships between the peacekeeping force and the local environment. Fruitful 
cooperation with civilian agencies, local authorities, tribal leaders and individuals 
constitutes an essential element that significantly contributes to the achievement of the 
mission’s goals. Peacekeepers, especially CIMIC personnel, must pay more attention to 
the local culture. Respect for local habits and knowledge of the history of the conflict in 
the region and of sources of clashes between belligerents, all matter in maintaining good 
civil-military cooperation. Unfortunately, peacekeepers often lack cultural background 
preparation, which drastically damages the communication between the forces and local 
communities.214 Thus, education and cultural training for peacekeepers plays an 
important role in the contemporary PSOs. Because CIMIC personnel perform their 
activities in a culturally different host country environment, it is particularly important to 
intensify cultural education and training for CIMIC staff. 
Peacekeepers need training in cultural awareness to help them, not only 
with the combatants, but also with local customs, meaningful contacts 
with citizens and other peacekeepers, and being good role models. 
Without such training, the peacekeepers’ own primordial sentiments and 
ethnocentrism are aroused, making them part of the problem rather than 
part of the solution.215  
Culture awareness can play a vital role for CIMIC personnel. CIMIC activities 
cannot be performed without a significant level of understanding of the local culture. 
Cultural awareness training programs and intercultural communication activities should 
constitute an integral part of peacekeepers training,216 especially for those to be deployed 
with CIMIC units. Soldiers acting within the peacekeeping environment should be 
equipped with the necessary knowledge concerning primordial emotions shared by the 
conflicting parties. Without solid cultural preparation, the CIMIC job can become 
impossible or considerably hampered. Thus, as Kimmel suggests, cultural awareness 
training should be conducted in three phases: 
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• First, education and training before deployment, in the countries 
contributing peacekeeping forces; 
• The second phase should be organized in a common place, near the actual 
location of the mission; and  
• The third part of the training would be performed in the field. People learn 
best through real experiences.  
Soldiers with an increased level of cultural awareness feel less “limited,” which 
would help them in a more active cross-cultural performance in the field. An adequate 
cultural preparation will surely facilitate smooth relations with IOs, NGOs and various 
local players. This, in turn, will appreciably improve the image of the military, creating 
good conditions for an enduring peace in the region.  
Victoria Edwards in “The Role of Communication in Peace and Relief Mission 
Negotiations” also notices the importance of cultural training for peacekeepers. Among 
the issues mentioned earlier, she explains, additional and concrete cultural training for 
soldiers taking part in PSOs should be encouraged. She argues that peacekeepers will be 
much more efficient if the trainings equip them with detailed knowledge of the country in 
which the mission is taking place. Things like “gift-giving practices, social and business 
dress, religious practices and holidays, dining and shopping, schooling and banking, and 
more subtle cultural differences, such as forms of discourse, basic values, ethical beliefs, 
and the rites and rituals”217 constitute an integral part of each culture, which, when 
learned, will extensively help peacekeepers in conducting their mission. These “small” 
cultural nuances cannot be ignored; they are especially important for CIMIC personnel 
whose culturally sensitive performance should constitute one of the main strengths.  
Contemporary peace support operations which apply procedures built on foreign 
cultural assumptions concerning conflict resolution, and which do not take into account 
the cultural background of the host country, substantially weaken the performance of the 
whole peacekeeping efforts.218 Indeed, although a culturally sensitive peacekeeping 
approach on the tactical level of operations is being discussed in this thesis, it is  
 
                                                 
217 Edwards. 
218 De Coning, 256. 
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important to notice that culture matters enormously on each level of operations. 
Politicians, strategists, IOs’ and NGOs’ managers, as well as higher military ranks, 
should all be culturally aware.  
2. The Importance of the Media 
Because positive media coverage can significantly support peace processes 
undertaken by the international community, media constitute an important element of the 
peacekeeping environment. Communication with the media and the way they provide the 
news considerably influences host country communities. Indigenous societies need to 
know about what is being done in their country, and what the mandate and the main 
objectives of the military mission are.219 Thus, Public Affairs offices (PAOs), which 
work with every peacekeeping operation nowadays, need to build necessary and 
permanent communication bridges to keep the local and international audiences well 
informed. Looking at CIMIC, it must be underlined that because its activities usually take 
part within the local environment, CIMIC personnel should be encouraged to play a 
complimentary role in the relations between PAOs and civil society. Meetings with local 
authorities, tribal leaders and individuals, and quick-impact, reconstructive infrastructure 
projects conducted by CIMIC usually attract media attention. On such occasions, it can 
dramatically improve the image of the military presence among native citizens, thus 
contributing to major improvements in the whole peacekeeping effort.  
CIMIC personnel should cooperate closely with public information offices to 
keep the audience well informed about their activities in the region. Because the 
international peacekeeping force often lacks the appropriate level of knowledge about the 
media and how to deal with them, it is crucial to introduce additional courses and training 
for soldiers to improve the individual’s communication skills.220 Moreover, this issue 
particularly concerns CIMIC units. Considering the nature of CIMIC performance, 
CIMIC staff must be aware that the media will permanently accompany them in the field. 
Thus, what is of great importance for effective and fruitful communication is that CIMIC 
officers must be equipped with necessary interviewing skills. Sufficiently prepared 
                                                 
219 De Coning, 263. 
220 See The Challenges Project, 239; and “Media and the Military,” Joint Services Warrant Officers’ 
Course, 7-2. 
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CIMIC staff will effectively transmit the military message to both the local and 
international audience and will improve the image of the peacekeeping effort appreciably.  
3. CIMIC and Interpreters 
Considering its core functions, CIMIC’s main task is to provide fruitful 
communication between the military and local communities, communication that would 
play a dual role – to support the main task of the mission’s commander, and to support 
the local community. CIMIC officers can fulfill their goals only when it is possible to 
communicate with the local society, which usually uses a different language. Thus, it is 
essential for CIMIC staff to understand the importance of interpreters, and know basic 
policies about how to use interpreters in the most efficient way.  
While working with interpreters is an art and needs continuous practice, knowing 
basic “hints” about how to work effectively with interpreters will radically improve 
CIMIC’s performance. For CIMIC officers who act within the local environment, it is 
even easier to understand the important role that interpreters play in the contemporary 
peacekeeping environment. As was suggested earlier, even without professional training, 
local language assistants can be very well equipped and appropriately briefed by CIMIC 
staff before every meeting, mediation, negotiation or simple conversation. An 
interpreter’s performance as a result of field experience will systematically improve over 
time. In addition, detailed briefings before the actual interpreting job can make the 
interpreter’s work better, as well. CIMIC personnel must understand that a locally hired 
interpreter, as a specialist in local relations and cultural background, comprises an 
important element in facilitating smooth communication between the military and the 
local communities in contemporary peacekeeping operations.  
4. Using Negotiations  
Successful peacekeeping soldiers must function well in environments 
where only minimal force is usually required. Under these circumstances, 
their strength lies not in their lethality but rather in their ability to 
negotiate and make compromises.221 
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In spite of the fact that negotiations constitute one of the most difficult skills for 
individuals to develop, CIMIC personnel must admit that having at least a basic 
negotiation background can noticeably improve their communication in the field. The 
nature of CIMIC field responsibilities is such that CIMIC officers face situations which 
demand the use of negotiation on a daily basis. Besides official and planned meetings, 
negotiations are often impromptu. Considering the stress caused by the uneven and often 
hostile environment in which peacekeepers act, smooth and effective communication can 
be very difficult. Additionally, because of the multicultural composition of the 
contemporary peacekeeping environment, cross-cultural communications with elements 
of negotiation greatly complicates interpersonal relationships. Thus, as mentioned above, 
the range of issues that can significantly hamper communication and negotiation in 
peacekeeping is very wide. So, one of the necessary ways of minimizing the negative 
influence of the peacekeeping environment on interpersonal communication, must be a 
development of fundamental conflict resolution and negotiation skills among 
peacekeepers.  The more peacekeepers know about conflict resolution and negotiation 
styles, the less problems they will meet in the field and the better they will perform.222 
Negotiation skills should constitute one of the core elements that peacekeepers are 
being taught.223 It is especially important for CIMIC personnel who encounter various 
negotiating situations while conducting their field activities. There is also another crucial 
fact about CIMIC and negotiations. As a result of a permanent presence within the local 
communities, CIMIC officers are usually the only ones who know diverse nuances 
concerning indigenous societies. The most influential people inside the local 
communities, tribal leaders and finally local authorities, all accompany CIMIC personnel 
on a daily basis. So, as was shown in the chapter devoted to negotiation issues, it is often 
the role of CIMIC staff to resolve local conflicts, which arise often in a war torn, fragile 
society. Negotiation and basic conflict resolution skills can prove necessary and very 
helpful under such circumstances.  
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5. CIMIC Officers – Grassroots Diplomats  
There is no effective cooperation without good communication. Indeed, because 
cooperation and coordination are the key expectations for CIMIC, communication 
between the multiple actors in peacekeeping environment plays a vital role for CIMIC 
personnel. Deborah Goodwin undoubtedly agrees with that statement. She argues that 
communication skills belong at the center of the skills needed for CA units for effective 
work in the contemporary peacekeeping environment. “The ability to understand 
different organizational, societal and national cultures is critical to the success of 
communicating in a multinational and multi-organizational environment.”224 So, as she 
suggests, even when CA officers have a great understanding of the mandate and a great 
set of other skills necessary for activities related to peace support operations, the final 
goal of the mission cannot be achieved without adequate communication abilities. 
CIMIC/CA personnel must possess a necessary set of communication skills, which are 
essential for building effective and smooth cooperation with the civilian “world.” 
Among the necessary set of skills which will allow the peacekeeper to act in the 
international, interdisciplinary and multicultural peacekeeping environment, CIMIC 
officers should also display additional talents which are more related to a diplomatic 
repertoire. Looking more closely, being outside a military compound, meeting and 
dealing with a multitude of various actors and resolving and negotiating local conflicts, 
CIMIC personnel act like military diplomats who represent not only the UN’s power or  
Mission Commander’s will, but also the countries they come from.225 Thus, some 
additional features of an individual’s personality such as “high morale, initiative, tact, 
patience”226 and increased cultural sensitivity are highly encouraged. Indeed, CIMIC 
staff act as tactical level military ambassadors who play and will continue to play an 
essential role in building stable and enduring peace in peace support operations around 
the world. 
                                                 
224 Goodwin, 92. 
225 For the idea of grassroots diplomats see United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Training, 12. 
226 The Challenges Project, 236. 
 97
Because the available literature exclusively concerning the effectiveness and 
efficiency of CIMIC units and individuals in contemporary peace support operations is 
very limited, it is difficult to determine whether CIMIC personnel are adequately 
equipped with communication skills for their missions. Thus, additional research that 
would examine CIMIC pre-deployment training and its effectiveness in the peacekeeping 
environment is recommended. However, looking at the available literature which 
analyzes training and efficiency aspects of peacekeepers as a whole, it is clear that 
soldiers taking part in PSOs still suffer from insufficient individual skills which 
significantly influence their effectiveness. So, it may be asserted that the level of 
CIMIC’s staff preparation, especially in the matters of communication skills such as 
dealing with the media, cooperation with interpreters, cross-cultural communication 
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